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ABSTRACT 
The  problem  of  achieving  COnlUnCtlve goals  has  been  central  to  domain-independent  planning 
research,  the nonhnear constraint-posting  approach has been  most successful  Previous planners  of 
this type have been  comphcated,  heurtstw, and ill-defined  1 have combmed and dtstdled  the state of 
the art into  a simple, precise,  Implemented  algorithm  (TWEAK) which I  have proved  correct  and 
complete  1 analyze  previous  work  on  domam-mdependent  conlunctwe plannmg;  tn  retrospect  tt 
becomes clear that all conluncttve planners,  hnear and nonhnear,  work the same way  The efficiency 
and correctness  of these planners depends  on the traditional  add/ delete-hst  representation  for actions, 
which drastically  limits  their usefulness  I present theorems that suggest  that efficient  general purpose 
planning  with more expressive  action  representations  ts impossible,  and suggest  ways  to avoid this 
problem 
I.  Introduction 
If you intend to use a  domain-independent planner as a workhorse black-box 
part  of  something  else,  you  care  whether  it  works.  Planners  of  the  most 
promising ("nonlinear") sort have been complicated, heuristic, ill-defined AI 
programs,  without  clear  conditions under which  they work.  This  paper  de- 
scribes  a  nonlinear  planner,  TWEAK,  that  has  few  novel  features,  but  is  a 
simple, precise algorithm I have proved correct and complete. 
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I  started  work on planning  because  !  wanted  a  planner  to coroutme with  a 
learner  to  make  an  integrated  problem  solver  [5].  I'd heard  that  Earl  Sacer- 
doti's NOAH was the state of the art in planning,  and decided to copy it exactly, 
since  I  had  no  interest  in  the  matter.  Four  readings  of  [50]  and  three 
misconceived implementations later,  I  had  a  planner that worked,  but no idea 
why.  To  determine  whether  it  would  work  as  a  reliable  subroutine,  I  had  to 
simplify the algorithm and representations and apply some mathematical rigor 
To quote  Sacerdotr 
[The  basic  operations  of  NOAH]  were  developed  in  an  ad  hoc 
fashion  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  justify  the  transformations 
that  they  perform,  or  to  enable  them  to  generate  all  transforma- 
tions.  However,  It  should  be  possible  to  define  an  algebra of plan 
transformations  ..  a body of formal theory about the ways m which 
interacting  subgoals can  be dealt  with.  [50] 
That is what  I've done  in  this paper. 
Rigor  of  formulation  not  only  gives  confidence  in  a  program,  it  may  be 
needed as a stable base for further research.  AI comes In "neat" and "scruffy" 
styles.  Nonlinear  planning  research  to  date  has  been  scruffy:  heuristic,  ill- 
understood,  unclear.  As  I  discovered,  scruffy  research  is  hard  to  duplicate. 
That is not Sacerdoti's fault, or mine: most AI research is necessarily like that. 
When working at the frontiers of knowledge,  you will make no progress if you 
wait to proceed until  you understand  clearly what you are doing.  But it is also 
hard  to  know when progress has been made  and  where  to go next before the 
scruffy work is neatened  up.  Neat and scruffy research on a  particular domain 
should  follow each  other  in  cycles.  Late in  this  neat  paper,  I  will  make some 
scruffy  suggestions  about  how  to  go  beyond  the  crucial  limitation  of  the 
domain-independent  planners  that  have been  implemented to date. 
1.1.  Nonlinear  conjunctive  planning 
The conjunctive  planning problem has been a  main focus of planning research 
for more than ten years. The problem is to achieve several goals simultaneous- 
ly:  to  find  a  plan  that  makes  a  conjunctive  formula  true  after  it  has  been 
executed.  To  make  a  planner  generally  useful,  it  should  be  domain-indepen- 
dent.  The  difficulty in  domain-independent  conjunctive  planning  is in  interac- 
tions between the means of achieving the individual goals. The following classic 
problem, known as the  "Sussman anomaly," illustrates the difficulty.  Suppose 
we have three blocks, a, b, and c; initially c is on a and a and b are on the table 
(situation  (1) in Fig.  1).  We want to have a stacked on b on e, or to achieve the 
conjunctive  goal  (and  (on  a  b)  (on  b  e))  (situation  (ii)).  Let's  say  you're  only 
allowed to move one block at a  time, so that the  top of a  block must be clear 
before it can be moved. If you try to put b on ¢ first, when you go to put a on b PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS 
FIG  1  The Sussman anomaly, with parnal outcomes 
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you fail, because c is on a  and so prevents it from moving (situation (iii)).  On 
the other hand, ff you try first to put a on b (removing e to make a  accessible), 
putting  b  on  e  is  made  impossible  by a,  which  is  in  the  way  (situation  (iv)). 
I'll  return  to  this  problem  later  in  the  paper  and  show  how  nonlinear 
planning can solve it.  The important idea,  due to Sacerdoti, is that a  plan (at 
least while it is being constructed)  does not have to specify fully the order of 
execution of its steps.  In other words,  a  plan is only a  partial order on steps; 
this is what  is meant  by nonhnear plannmg. 
1.2.  Guide  to this  paper 
The next section explains how and why TWEAK works.  The section is divided 
into three subsections:  the first explains what a plan is; the second shows how 
to  improve  incomplete  plans;  and  the  third  describes  the  overall  control 
structure  of the planner. 
Section  3  covers  related  and  future  work.  I  analyze  previous  planning 
research  using  the  analyncal  tools  developed  m  Section  2,  showing  that  all 
domain-independent  conjunctive planners  work  the  same  way.  I  suggest that 
the restrictions on representations of actions that these planners depend upon 
are  their  crucial  limitation,  and  show  that  there  are  complexity-theoretic 
barriers to lifting these restrictions. 
The last section presents  brief conclusions. 
2.  TWEAK 
TWEAK is  a  rigorous mathematical  reconstruction of previous nonlinear plan- 
ners.  TWEAK 1s also an implemented, running program. This section describes 
the  algorithm  and  proves  it  correct.  TWEAK  comes  in  three  layers:  a  plan 
representation,  a  way to make  a  plan  achieve a  goal,  and  a  top-level control 
structure.  Each  layer  is  described  in  more  detail  in  one  of the  next  three 
subsections  of this section.  The fourth subsection gives a  detailed scenario of 
TWEAK  solving  the  Sussman  anomaly problem  described  in  the  last  section. 
The  plan  representation  is  the  most  complex  layer.  The  basic  operanon 
provided by this representation determines whether a  proposition will be true 
of the world after part of a plan has been executed. An efficient algorithm for 
this operation depends on a  subtle theorem about incompletely defined plans, 336  D  CHAPMAN 
gwen  in  Section 2  1.  Section 2.2  describes  a  nondeterminlstlc procedure that 
transforms  a  plan  so  that  ~t  achieves  a  goal  that  It  previously  did  not  The 
top-level control structure, described in Section 2.3, controls this nondetermm- 
lsm  Because  choosing  how  to  make  a  plan  achieve  a  goal  is  difficult, 
backtracking search is  used to recover from wrong choices.  Here  I prove that 
TWEAK is  complete,  if a  solution to a  problem  exists,  TWEAK wall find ~t 
2.1.  The plan representation 
In this section I define plans, problems, and what it means for a plan to solve a 
problem.  I  present  a  criterion which allows TWEAK to reason about what  will 
be  true  in  the  world  as  a  plan  is  executed.  Inevitably most  of this  section  is 
composed of dry and obvious definitions  Proofs are deferred to Appendix A. 
TWEAK is  a  constraint-posting  planner.  Constraint  posting  is  the  process of 
defining  an  object,  a  plan  m  this  case,  by  incrementally  specifying  partial 
descriptions  (constraints)  it  must  fit.  Alternatively,  constraint  posting  can  be 
viewed as a search strategy in which, rather than generating and testing specific 
alternatives,  chunks  of  the  search  space  are  progressively  removed  from 
consideration  by constraints  that  rule  them  out,  until  finally every remaining 
alternative is satisfactory. The advantage of the constraint-posting approach is 
that properties of the object being searched for do not have to be chosen until 
a  reasoned  decision  can  be  made.  This  reduction  of  arbitrary  choice  often 
reduces backtracking. 
As TWEAK works on a problem, it has at all times an mcomplete plan, which 
is a partial specification of a plan that may solve the problem. This incomplete 
plan  could  be  completed  in  many  different  ways,  depending  on  what  con- 
straints  are  added  to  it;  thus  ~t  represents  a  class  of  complete  plans.  The 
incomplete  plan  supplies  partial  knowledge  of  the  complete  plan  that  will 
eventually  be  chosen;  planning  is  finished  when  all  the  completions  of  the 
incomplete plan solve the given problem.  I will say "necessarily p" if p is true 
of all completions of an incomplete plan, and "posstbly  p" if p  is true of some 
completion.  Adding  a  constraint  to a  plan  can often rule out  all  the  comple- 
tions;  the  set of constraints  is  then mconststent,  and  no longer defines a  valid 
incomplete plan.  At this point backtracking must be invoked. The number of 
completions  of a  plan  is  exponential  in  its  size,  so computing whether some- 
thing  is possible  or necessary by searching completions would be very expen- 
swe.  The  heart  of th~s  section ~s  a  polynomml-t~me algorithm  that  computes 
possible  and  necessary properties of an mcomplete plan. 
TWEAK's  plan representation is very simple.  It is so restrictive that it cannot 
represent most domains; I will explain why in Section 3.2.1. A  complete plan Is 
a  total  order  on  a  fimte  set  of steps.  The  order  represents  time;  the  steps, 
actions.  The plan  IS executed by performing the  actions corresponding to the 
steps  m  the  order  gwen  A  step  has  a  finite  set  of precondmons,  which  are 
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be performed.  A  step  also  has  finitely many postcondittons,  which  are  things 
that  the  action  guarantees  will  be  true  about  the  world  after  it  has  been 
performed. Pre- and postconditions are both expressed as propositions.  Propo- 
sitions have a content,  which is a tuple of elements,  and can be negated or not. 
Elements  can  be  variables or  constants;  there  are  infinitely  many  of  each. 
Functions,  propositional  operators  and  quantification  are  not  allowed:  all 
propositions  are  function-free atomic.  (See  Section  3 2.3  to  understand  why 
there must be infinitely many variables and constants and Section 3.2.1 for why 
propositions must be so simple.) Two propositions are negations of each other 
if one is negated and the other is not and they have the same content (strictly, 
necessardy codesignatmg content,  a  notion that  I  haven't introduced yet). I'll 
write propositions like this:  (on a x) and this: -  (on a x). These two propositions 
have  the  same  content  tuple,  the  three  elements  on,  a,  and  x;  the  second  is 
negated and  the first ~s  not 
Plans  in  TWEAK  can  be  incomplete  in  two  ways:  the  time  order  may  be 
incompletely  specified,  using  temporal  constraints,  and  steps  may  be  incom- 
pletely specified,  using  codesignation  constramts.  A  temporal  constraint  is  a 
requirement that one step be before another; thus a set of temporal constraints 
~s simply a partml order on steps. A  completion  of a set of temporal constraints 
C  is  any  total  order  O  on  the  same  set  of steps  such  that  sCt  ~mplies  sOt. 
(Every ordering in  the  incomplete plan  must  also hold in the  complete one.) 
Codesignation  is  an  equivalence  relation  on  variables  and  constants.  In  a 
complete plan,  each variable that  appears  in  a  pre- or postcondltion must  be 
constrained to codesignate with  (effectively, be bound to)  a  specific constant. 
In execution, that constant will be substituted for the variable when the action 
is performed.  Codes~gnation constraints enforce codeslgnation or noncodesig- 
nation of elements.  Distinct constants may not codesignate.  Two propositions 
codesignate if both are negated or both are not and if their contents are of the 
same  length  and  if corresponding  elements  in  the  contents  codesignate.  For 
example,  the  propositions  (on  a  x)  and  (on  a  y)  codesignate  lff  x  and  y 
codeslgnate. 
Recall  the  general  definitions  of  necessary  and  possible;  thereby,  two 
propositions in an incomplete plan necessarily codesignate if they codesignate 
m  all completions; in other words no matter what constraints are added.  You 
can  constrain  two  possibly  codesignating  propositions  to  necessarily codesig- 
nate  by  constraining  all  the  corresponding  elements  of  their  contents  to 
codes~gnate.  Th~s  amounts  to  unification  of  the  two  propositions.  You  can 
constrain  two  possibly  noncodesignating  propositions  to  necessarily  not 
codesignate  by choosing some  tuple  index and  constraining  noncodesignation 
of the two elements at that index in the content tuples of the two propositions. 
For example,  (on a  x)  and  (on a  y) can  be made to necessarily codesignate by 
making x and y necessarily codesignate,  and to necessarily not codesignate by 
making x and y necessarily not codesignate. 
As  steps  are  executed  the  state  of the  world  changes.  TWEAK  represents 338  D  CHAPMAN 
states of the world with sttuaUons, which are sets of proposmons. A  plan has an 
inmal situation,  which is  a  set of propositions describing the world at the  rime 
that the plan is to be executed,  and a final situation,  which describes the  state 
of the world after the whole plan has been executed.  Associated w~th each step 
in  a  plan  ~s its  mput situation,  which is the  set of propositions that are true  In 
the world lust before it ~s executed,  and its output situation,  whmh is the set of 
propositions that  are  true  in the world just  after it  is  executed.  In a  complete 
plan,  the Input situanon of each step is the same as the output situation ot the 
previous  step.  The  final  s~tuation  of  a  complete  plan  has  the  same  set  of 
propositions  in  it  as  the  output  situation  of  the  last  step.  The  time  order 
extends  to situations,  the  inmal  and final SltUaUons  are  before and after every 
other situation respectively. The input s~tuatlon of a step is before the step and 
after every other situation that is before the step; the output situation of a step 
is  after  the  step  and  before  any other situation  that  is  after  the  step 
A  proposition is true tn a situation if It codeslgnates with a proposition that is 
a member of the situanon.  A  step asserts a proposition in its output situation if 
the proposition codeslgnates with a  postcondltion of the step.  A  proposition is 
asserted  in  the  mltial  situation  if  it  true  in  that  snuanon  A  proposition  is 
dented  m  a  situation  if  its  negation  is  asserted  there.  It's  illegal  for  a 
proposmon to  be  both  asserted  and  denied  in  a  s,tuatlon 
A  step  can  be  executed  only  if  all  ~ts  preconditions  are  true  in  its  input 
situation  In th~s case, the output situation is just the input situation minus any 
propositions  denied  by  the  step,  plus  any  propositions  asserted  by  the  step. 
(The order matters.  Also, this is  not the same thing as the Input sltuanon plus 
the  propositions asserted  by the step:  if p  were true m  the  input SltUanon  and 
the step asserts -p,  then the output situation must not contain both p  and -p; 
mput and output situations  must be  consistent sets  of propositions,  since  they 
describe  states  o!  the  world.)  This  model  of  execunon  does  not  allow  for 
indirect  or  lmphed  effects  of  actions  or  for  uncertainty  of  execution;  any 
changes  in  the  world  must  be  explicitly  mentioned  as  postcondltlOnS  I  will 
have  more  to say about  th~s restriction  in  Section 3 2  1 
I  use  graphs,  as  m  Figs.  2-4,  to  dlustrate  plans  Steps  are  boxes,  the 
preconditions  are  put  before  or  above  the  box  and  postconditlons  after  or 
(there x)  (get x) 
(there milk) [  (get  milk) 
Fm  2  An incomplete plan 
(here x),,, 
(there x)~'~ 
(here  m,lk)  ,,,~ ~  t .........  ,, 
[ 4 (there milk) 
(pour  mdk  x) ] 
-(h~re ×) 
/here  breakfast) 
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(there mdk)[  (get mdk) 
(there cheerios) 
Ik)  ](here ch  ...... )  (cer!ahlerc~eCehr~ersl  °s)]  [~(herech ...... )  i(h  .I  ~h  ..... )1  H(~ .....  ,,  I(he.e~re.".~tl  (set  .q 
I~l,h  ..... lk)  /  ]~(th,re eh ...... )  (h .....  lk) l  ch  ...... )l_lh  ..... ;k) 
FIG  3  One completion of the  example plan 
lmt~at  After (get rmlk)  After (get cheerms)  Final 
FIG  4  The sequence of s~tuatlons resulting from executing the compleUon 
below.  The  steps  may have labels inside,  but these  are only mnemonic.  Arcs 
represent the partial time order.  Ovals are  situations. 
Durmg planning,  incompleteness introduces uncertainty into the meaning of 
a  plan.  To use  a  blocks world  example,  if v  is  a  variable,  after asserting  (on 
block v),  there's  no  way  to  tell  whether  (on block c)  is  true  or false,  unless  v 
necessarily  codesignates  with  a  particular  constant.  I  will  now  sketch  the 
derivation of a criterion that tells you when a proposition is necessarily true in 
a  situation.  Of course  a  proposition  is  necessarily true  in  a  situation  if it  ~s 
necessarily asserted in it.  Once a proposition has been asserted, it remains true 
until  denied.  Thus  a  proposition p  is necessarily true  in  a  situation  if there is 
some  previous  situation  in  which  it  is  necessarily  true,  and  no  possibly 
intervening step  possibly denies  it:  for if there is  a  step  that  is  even possibly 
in-between that even possibly denies p, there is a completion in which the step 
actually  is  in-between  and  actually  denies  p.  (A  step  possibly  denies p  by 
denying  a  proposition  q  which  possibly  codesignates  with  p).  Oddly,  the 
converse of this criterion is not true; the incomplete plan in Fig. 5 illustrates an 
exception.  If p  and  q  are  possibly codesignating,  this plan  has  two classes  of 
completions:  ones in which p  and q  actually codesignate,  so that p  is asserted 
by step 3;  and ones in which p  and q  do not codesignate,  so that p  is asserted 
by step  1,  and is  never denied  In either case, p  ~s true in the final situation, 
even  though  no  one  step  necessarily  asserts  p  without  an  intervening  step 
possibly denying it.  The  complete criterion,  extended to  cover such  cases,  is 
the following. 
FIG  5  An odd plan 
r T 
L __.l~q  " ...... ~r 
FIG.  6  The necessary truth criterion 340  D  CHAPMAN 
Modal Truth Criterion. A  proposttton p  ts necessardy true m  a sttuanon s tff two 
conditions hold: there ts a sltuatton t equal or necessardy prevtous  to stn  whtch 
p  ts  necessartly  asserted,  and  for  every  step  C  posstbly  before  s  and  every 
proposttton  q  possibly  codeslgnatmg  wtth p  whtch  C  denies,  there  ts  a  step  W 
necessartly  between  C  and  s  whtch  asserts  r,  a  proposition  such  that  r  and p 
codesignate  whenever p  and  q  codesignate.  The  crttenon for  posstble  truth  ts 
exactly  analogous,  wtth  all  the  modalittes  swttched  (read  "necessary"  for 
"posstble"  and vtce  versa) 
The  necessary truth  criterion  1s  diagrammed  in  Fig.  6.  Solid lines  indicate 
necessarily  time-relatedness  and  dashed  lines  possible  time-relatedness;  the 
dashed  box,  a  disallowed  step;  the  dotted  box  a  step  that  would  make  the 
dashed step legal. I call situations t necessarily before s that necessarily assert p 
estabhshers;  steps C defined as in the statement of the theorem clobberers;  and 
steps  W that foil steps that would otherwise become clobberers, whtte kmghts. 
If a  step  C  is before t, certainly it does not clobber p;  but in such a  case, the 
step of which t is the  output situation  acts itself as  a  white  knight 
The  part  of the  criterion  about  white  knights  is  counter-intuitive,  but  it  is 
needed,  as  illustrated  by  the  previously illustrated  odd  plan.  More  complex 
codesignation implications  can  also  occur,  for example,  the  propositions  (xy) 
and  (y z)  must codesignate if (x y) and  (z x) do 
The truth criterion can usefully be thought of as a  completeness/soundness 
theorem for a  version of the  situation calculus. 
The criterion can be interpreted procedurally in the obvious way.  It runs in 
time  polynomial  in  the  number  of  steps:  the  body  of  the  criterion  can  be 
verified for  each  of the  n 3 triples  (t, C, W)  with  a  fixed  set  of calls  on  the 
polynomial-time constraint-maintenance  module.  (The exponent in  this  poly- 
nomial  can  be  reduced  with  dynamic  programming;  this  is  essentially  what 
Tate's GOST does [68].) However, the modal truth criterion does exponentially 
much  "work"  by  describing  properties  of  the  exponentially  large  set  of 
completions  of  an  incomplete  plan.  (Strictly,  there  may  be  infinitely  many 
completions,  since  there  are  infinitely  many  constants  the  variables  could 
codeslgnate  with;  but  since  all  but  finitely many constants  are  unconstrained 
and so equivalent, there are only exponentially many that are not isomorphic.) 
The remainder of TWEAK depends  heavily on the  criterion. 
Now  I  will  define  problems  and  their  solutions.  A  problem  is  an  initial 
sttuation  and a final sttuation, which are two sets of propositions. A  plan for a 
problem  is one such that  every proposition in its initial situation is true in the 
initial situation of the problem. A  goal is a proposition which must be achieved 
(true) in a certain situation. The goals of a plan for a problem are defined to be 
the propositions in the final situation of the problem, which must be true in the 
final  situation  of the  plan,  and  the  preconditions  of steps  in  the plan,  which 
must  be  true  in  the  corresponding  input  situations.  A  complete  plan  for  a 
problem solves the problem if all its goals are achieved. Thus, a complete plan PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  341 
solves a problem if it can be executed in the initial situation of the problem and 
if the final situation of the problem is a correct partial description of the world 
after execution. The aim of TWEAK is tO produce a plan that necessarily solves 
the problem it is given. This plan may be incomplete, in which case any of its 
completions can be chosen for execution. 
2.2.  Making a  plan achieve a  goal 
TWEAK's contract is to produce a plan for a specific problem it is given. TWEAK 
has at all times an incomplete plan, initially null, which is an approximation to 
a  plan  that solves the problem.  The top-level loop of the planner repeatedly 
chooses a  goal and to tries to make the plan achieve it. This section describes 
TWEAK's procedure  for making the plan achieve the goal. 
The  goal-achtevement  procedure  is  derived  by  interpreting  the  necessary 
truth  criterion  as  a  nondeterministic procedure.  The  criterion  tells us  all the 
ways  a  proposition  could  be  necessarily true;  the  procedure  chooses  one  of 
them and modifies the plan accordingly. To make a situation be before another 
or to make two propositions codesignate or not codesignate, the procedure just 
adds  constraints.  These  constraints  may  be  incompatible  with  existing  con- 
straints:  for  example,  you  can't  constrain  s  before  t  if  you  have  already 
constrained t before s. The constraint-maintenance mechanism signals failure in 
these  cases,  and  the  top-level  control  structure  backtracks.  Since  the  set  of 
things possibly asserted in a  situation cannot be  changed, to make a  proposi- 
tion  necessarily asserted there,  the procedure  constrains codesignation of the 
given proposition with one of those asserted. There are two ways to instantiate 
an existentially quantified situation nondeterministlcally: by choosing an exist- 
ing situation in  the  plan  or  by adding a  new step  to  the  plan  and taking its 
output  situation  as  the  value  of the  existentially quantified variable.  One  of 
these two ways must be chosen nondeterministically. Logical operators in the 
statement  of  the  criterion  can  also  be  interpreted  procedurally:  universal 
quantification over a  set becomes iteration over that set; existential quantifica- 
tion a nondeterminlstic choice from a set; disjunction a simple nondeterministic 
choice; and conjunction, several things that must all be done. 
Let ~- and ~  stand for codesignation and noncodesignation respectively; let [] 
and ~  stand for "necessarily" and "possibly"; let  <  represent the time order, 
and  ~<  represent  temporal  precedence  or equality.  Then the  necessary truth 
criterion m  logical notation reads thusly: 
=It 7qt ~< s/x [] asserted-in(p, t) ^ 
VCC]s<~ C v 
Vq []-  denies(C, q) v 
E]q~p  v 
3WE3C < W^ 
•W<s^ 
::1 r asserts(W, r) ^ p =  q :ff p  ~  r 342  D  CHAPMAN 
Figure  7  illustrates  the  structure  of  the  nondetermlnlstic  procedure  This 
figure is a parse tree of the necessary truth crltenon,  modified according to the 
paragraph  above  on  procedural  interpretation.  In  the  diagram, v  means  to 
choose  one  of  the  alternate  paths, A tells  you  to  do  all  the  paths;  3  means 
"choose  a";  'q  tells  you  to  apply  the  following  path  to  every  one.  The  leat 
nodes  are  constraints  that  should  be  added  to  the  plan.  u  ranges  over  the 
propositions  necessarily  true  in  t,  q  ranges  over  postcondaions  of  C;  r  over 
postcondmons of W.  Choosing  t and  W  may or may not  require  the  introduc- 
tion  of a  new  step,  as  explained  earlier 
A  number of further comments are needed to fully specify the details of the 
procedure  Step  addiuon  revolves choosing what  step to  add.  Every step in  a 
plan must represent an action that is possible to execute m  the domain m which 
the  problem  is  specified.  To  even  possibly  achieve  a  goal p  by addition,  the 
added step must assert a  proposmon possibly codesignatlng with p. The choice 
of steps, then,  is among those that are allowed in the domain and that possibly 
assert  the  desired  goal.  The  user  must  supply TWEAK  with  a  set  of template 
steps that TWEAK can use. These are formally idenncal to plan steps; they have 
preconditions  and postcondltions,  which  typically involve variables which may 
have  codesignat~on  constraints  between  them.  Step templates  are  mstanttated 
by copying the  step,  proposition,  variable  and  codesignanon  constraint  data- 
structures.  Constants  are  not  copied;  if  a  step  template  refers  to  a  specific 
object in  the  world,  all instances  should  refer to  the  same one 
Making  p  ~q  imply p  =  r  is  tricky;  this  can  not  be  expressed  as  a  single 
codesignation constraint or even as a set of constraints.  It is sometimes possible 
to constrain p  =  q ~  p  ~  r w~th  a  simpler constraint than either p  •  q  or p  ~  r. 
(w x y)  and  (u y z)  can  be  made  to  codeslgnate  m  case  (w x y)  and  (w z x)  do  by 
constraining  w ~- u.  In general,  there may be several ways to ensure a  codesig- 
nation  implication  using constraints  between  elements,  and  one of these  must 
be chosen  nondeterminlstically. 
Alternative paths through  the procedure are called plan  modtficanon  opera- 
ttons,  and  are  labeled  in  italics  in  the  dmgram  I'll  refer  to  these  individual 
operations  later  in  the  paper.  The  path  that  leads  to  constraining s <  C  I  call 
s~mple estabhshrnent 
3  new  t  A--~u--p~U  establ~shmen~ V  step add~twn 
A  wMte knzght  /  C  "~  l{ ~ 
Vq--V---3EV ~  3 old  W---7"/~--/W ~  8 
separatzon 
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promotion.  Demotion is  a  particular subcase of declobbering by white knight 
that is symmetric with promotion. Demotion is the case in which t is chosen to 
be  the  output situation of W,  so  that the  clobberer is  nullified by moving it 
before the estabhsher. 
One additional way to achieve a goal is imaginable: to remove a clobbering 
step  C.  This  would  not  help:  every  step  is  introduced to  assert  some  goal 
proposition, and removing one makes negative progress. Moreover, the search 
control structure guarantees that the same plan without the clobbering step will 
be  found eventually anyway, and  it  is  never  the  case  that the  only way to 
achieve a goal is to remove a step. Apart from this, the achievement procedure 
encompasses a//the ways to make an incomplete plan achieve a goal, because 
the modal truth criterion is sufficient as well as necessary.  So in this respect 
TWEAK can not be improved upon. 
The goal-achievement procedure has the useful property that so long as step 
addition is avoided, the new plan wdl continue to necessarily achieve any goals 
that it previously did. That's because the rest of the procedure operates only by 
adding constramts.  When constraints are  added,  things that were previously 
possibly true  become either necessarily true or necessarily false, but  nothing 
that is necessarily true can change its truth value. 
Step addition adds new preconditions to the plan that need to be achieved, 
and the  added step  may also deny, and so  undo,  previously achieved goals. 
This  in  unavoidable,  and  it  can  lead  to  infinite looping.  Therefore,  TWEAK 
prefers constraint posting to step addition. 
2.3.  The top-level  control structure 
TWEAK begins work on  a  problem with a  first incomplete plan whose imtial 
situation  is  the  initial  situation  of the  problem  and  which  has  no  steps  or 
constraints. It then enters a loop in which some goal not yet achieved is chosen 
and the procedure of the last section is applied, yielding a new plan. When all 
the plan's goals are achieved, the plan necessarily solves the problem. Choos- 
ing  which  goal  to  achieve  and  which  choices  to  make  in  the  achievement 
procedure is very difficult; certainly it is not always possible to choose right the 
first  time.  Therefore  the  top-level  control  structure  of  TWEAK is  a  search 
through the space of alternate paths through the goal-achievement procedure. 
People  have  thought a  lot  about  what  sort  of search  to use;  this work is 
reviewed in Section 3.4.  Since none of the search strategies developed so far 
seem  very  good,  I  simply  use  dependency-directed breadth-first  search  in 
TWEAK. I shan't argue for breadth-first search; it's certainly too expensive for 
general use.  However, the use of dependency-directed search deserves some 
justification. 
Dependency-directed backtracking [15] is more efficient than chronological 
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subparts,  so that  after  a  failure  in  one part,  only the  work done  oll  that  part 
needs to be undone;  work on other parts can be saved. TWEAK does have this 
property when running in  many domains  For example, m  the blocks world,  if 
the goal is to build two disjoint structures,  the search space can be divided into 
the part concerned with building the one and the part concerned with building 
the other.  Fadure  m  building  the one structure will not affect partml successes 
achieved thus  far in  building  the  other. 
Because  step  addition  can  make  the  plan  grow arbitrarily large,  the  search 
may  never  converge  on  a  plan  that  necessarily  solves  the  problem.  In  fact, 
there  are  three  possible  outcomes:  success,  m  which  a  plan  is  found,  failure, 
when  the  planner  has  exhaustively  searched  the  space  of sequences  of plan 
modification operations,  and every branch fails; and nonterminatlon,  when the 
plan grows larger and  larger and  more and more operations  are  applied  to it, 
but  it  never converges to solve the  problem 
Outcomes  Lemma.  Each  of the  three outcomes  ts posstble for some  chotce  of 
domain  and problem 
This is  a  central  theorem  of this  paper: 
Correctness/Completeness  Theorem.  If  TWEAK,  given  a  problem,  termmates 
claiming  a  solutton,  the  plan  tt produces  does  m  fact  solve  the  problem.  If 
TWEAK  returns stgnalling fadure  or does not halt,  no solution  extsts. 
This  theorem  leaves  httle  room  for  improvement.  Perhaps  loop-detection 
heuristics  or techniques  for prowng no solution  exists could  make TWEAK fall 
into mfinite loops less often. An obvious question is whether planning is in fact 
decidable:  whether it is possible to make a complete planner that always halts. 
First  Undecidability  Theorem.  Any  Turmg  machine  with  its  mput  can  be 
encoded as a plannmg problem  in the  TWEAK  representation.  Therefore, plan- 
ning  ts  undecidable,  and  no  upper  bound  can  be put  on  the  amount  of ttme 
requtred to solve a problem. 
This theorem is weaker than it may appear, for two reasons.  F~rst, the proof 
uses an infinite  (though recursive) initial state to model the connectivity of the 
Turing machine's tape.  It may be that if problems are restricted to have finite 
initial states, planning is decidable.  (This is not obviously true, though.  A  finite 
initial  state  does  not  imply  a  finite  search  space.  There  are  infinitely  many 
constants,  and an action can m  effect "gensym" one by referring to a  variable 
in  ~ts postconditions  that  is not  mentioned  in  its preconditions.)  Section 3.2.1 
shows  in  passing  that  planning  is  undecidable  with  even finite  initial  states  if 
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that the size of the shortest plan to solve a  problem may be arbitrarily large, 
rather  than  that  the  process  of planning itself is  complex.  In  fact,  no  back- 
tracking is required to solve the Turing machine-encoding problems. 
2.4.  Example 
To give a  feel for TWEAK doing its thing, I'll show how it solves the Sussman 
anomaly problem introduced in Section 1.1. Refer to Fig. 1 for the definition of 
the problem.  Logically, only one action is available in this domain, puton  puton 
has three preconditions, (on x z), (clear x), and (clear y); and four postconditions, 
(on x y), -  (on x z), -- (clear y), and (clear z). z represents the block on which x lies 
before the puton takes place.  There also must be noncodesignation constraints 
to the effect that x, y, and z are all distinct, and that x is not the table, which 
can't be moved. This isn't quite good enough: the table is always clear (always 
can have more put on it),  and putting something on the table doesn't change 
that. We must constrain y not to codesignate with the table and use a different 
action,  newtower,  to  put  a  block  onto  the  table  (and  so  start  a  new  tower). 
newtower  has  preconditions  (on  x z)  and  (clear  x)  and  postconditions  (on  x 
table), -- (on x z),  and  (clear  z).  Codesignation constraints ensure that x,  z,  and 
table  are  all  distinct.  See  Fig.  8  for  illustrations  of  the  blocks  world  step 
templates. 
I'll assume that the  nondeterministlc control  structure  always guesses right 
the first time.  TWEAK begins with the two top-level goals (on a b) and (on b c). 
Each is achieved by adding a  puton step; see Fig. 9. The variables lnstantiating 
x and y are constrained to codesignate with the goals.  I  have been somewhat 
sloppy and textually substituted constants for the variables that are bound to 
them.  z 1 and z 2 are the instantiations of z. 
Unachieved preconditions are starred. The on preconditions are achieved by 
being constrained to codesignate with propositions in the initial situation; see 
Fig. 10. The precondition (clear b) of the second step is unachieved because the 
first step  is  possibly before  the  second  and  denies  the  precondition.  TWEAK 
Oil X  Z) 
(clear x) 
(clear y) 
(putonx y) 
(on x y) 
-(on x z) 
~(clear y) 
(clear z) 
FIG  8  The blocks world step templates. 
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(on x table) 
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*(( ]e,u ,i) 
(( le,u  b) 
I  (1)uton a I)) 
(,)n  a b) 
--{( l('al  b) 
(( h'al  /1/ 
FIG  9  A first incomplete plan for the 
* (on  b  z2) 
*(( lear  b) 
(~ lear  ~ ) 
(pulon l> ( ) 
(OI1  b  ( ) 
--(oi1 b  z2) 
~-(¢ lear ~  ) 
(( lear Z  2) 
Sussman anomaly 
((m a table)  (on b  table) 
*(dear a)  *(clear b) 
(clear b)  (clear c) 
(o,,  a b)  (on  b ~) 
(()II  d  table)  --(oi|  b  table) 
--(clear b)  ~(clear c) 
((leal  tal,le)  ((leal  la})le) 
FIG  10  A  second incomplete plan for the Sussman anomaly 
achieves  (clear  b)  by promotion  of (puton  a b)  (Fig  11)  Then  the  precondition 
(clear  a)  of  (puton  a b)  is  achmved  by  addition  of a  newtower step.  This  has  a 
precondition  (on x a) which is satisfied by being constrained to codesignate  with 
(on  ca),  which  is  true  m  the  mitml  situation.  See  Fag.  12.  Finally  TWEAK 
achieves  (clear c)  by  promotion  of (puton  b c);  see  Fig  13 
(on b table)  (on a tat)le) 
(clear b)  *(clear a) 
(clear e)  (clear b) 
l  [  (puton b c)  /] 
(on  b c)  (on  a b) 
---(on b table)  ~(on a table) 
-(clear c)  ~(clear b) 
(, lear table)  (( lear tabh') 
FIG  11  A  third incomplete plan for the Sussman anomaly PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  347 
(on b table)  (on a table) 
(clear b)  (clear a)  (on c a) 
(clear c)  (clear b)  *(clear c) 
/P°t°" b c) II  ld  (puton a b)[~  b  II/newt°'er  c)l 
(on  b c)  (on a b)  (on c table) 
~(on b table)  ~(on a table)  ~(on c a) 
~(clear c)  ~(clear b)  (clear  a) 
(clear table)  (clear table) 
FIG  12  A fourth incomplete plan for the Sussman anomaly 
Fm  13 
(on b table)  (on a table) 
(on c a)  (clear b)  (clear a) 
(clear c)  (clear c)  (clear b} 
(on c table)  (on  b c)  (on a b) 
~(on c a)  ~(on b table)  ~(on a table) 
(clear  a)  ~(clear c)  ~(clear b) 
(clear table)  (clear table) 
A plan that solves the Sussman anomaly 
3.  Past and Future  Planning Research 
The  three  main  points  of  this  section  are  that  in  retrospect  all  domain- 
independent  conjunctive planners  work  the  same  way;  that  the  action repre- 
sentation which they depend on is inadequate for the real-world planning; and 
that desirable extensions to this action representation make planning exponen- 
tially  harder.  It  is  much  longer  than  such  sections  are  in  typical  AI  papers 
because  domain-independent  conjunctive planning  is unusual  as a  subfield of 
AI  in  showing  a  clear  line  of researchers  duplicating  and  building  on  each 
other's  work.  Science is  supposed  to  be  like  that,  but  for the  most  part  AI 
hasn't been. 
I  restrict  attention  to  domain-independent  conjunctive  planning,  ignoring 
planners and parts thereof that are domain-dependent or nonconjunctive. This 
may seem unfair at times. There are two previous survey articles on this topic, 
[51, 66].  The facts I  consider are much the same as those covered by the other 
papers;  my analyses of many points  are different. 
The  first  subsection  in  this  section  is  a  historical  overview  of  domain- 
independent  conjunctive  planning,  showing  how  different  planners  build  on 348  D  CHAPMAN 
one another, with particular emphasis on the history of the ideas embodied in 
TWEAK. The other three subsections are devoted to the history and future of 
the  three  levels  of a  conjunctive planner:  representation,  plan  modification 
operations, and top-level search strategies. The most interesting suggestions for 
future research are in Section 3.2.1 on action representation; the most interest- 
mg analysis of past work is in Section 3.3 on plan modification operattons. 
3.1.  Chronology 
Two important "prehistorical" nonconjunctive planners introduced techniques 
that underlie all the conjunctive planning work. oPS [40], due to Allen Newell, 
J.C.  Shaw,  and  Herbert  Simon, introduced means-ends analysts,  which is  to 
say step addition or subgoaling: solving problems by applying an operator that 
would achieve some goal of the problem, and taking the preconditions of the 
operator  as  new goals.  STRIPS [18],  due to  Richard  Fikes  and  Nils  Nilsson, 
contributed the action model--in which steps have postconditions that are the 
only things that get changed by the step--that is used by all domain-indepen- 
dent conjunctive planners 
1959  GPS 
1971  STRIPS 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
HACKER 
VvARPLANN.  ~  ~/TERPLAN 
NONLIN  ~ 
MOLGEN 
DEVISER  / 
SIPE 
I 
TWEAK 
FIG  14  Conjunctive  planning  a family  tree PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  349 
Domain-independent conjunctive planning begins in  1973 with Gerald Jay 
Sussman's HACKER [60]. Sussman ended his thesis with the problem described 
in  Section  1.1,  due  to  Allen  Brown  but  widely  known  as  "the  Sussman 
anomaly," which  HACKER could  not  solve  without  resort  to  what  Sussman 
called a  "hack." 
The urge to find a clean solution to the Sussman anomaly drove a series of 
rapid  developments over the  next four years.  David Warren's WARPLAN [73] 
and  Austin  Tate's  INTERPLAN [61-63],  both  of 1974, cleaned up  Sussman's 
ad-hoc "hack": promotion, in fact. Richard Waldringer [72] further generalized 
promotion. 
In  1975 came  Earl  Sacerdoti's  NOAH [49, 50],  the  first  nonlinear planner. 
Besides his improvement in the representation of plans, Sacerdotl substantially 
expanded the  set  of plan  modification operations.  Tate  (the  same  author of 
INTERPLAN) improved on NOAH in  1976. NONLIN [64, 65]  had a backtracking 
top-level control structure,  so  that it could find plans  after NOAH would get 
stuck, and added to NOAH'S set of plan modification operations. 
After 1976, there was a  great drought for many years. During this period, 
there  was  one  important  piece  of work  on  nonconjunctive planning:  Mark 
Stefik's MOLGEN  [54]  made constraints a central technique in planning for the 
first time.  Conjunctive planning was not advanced until a  new spurt of work 
beginning in 1982. 
All  the  new  conjunctive  planners  were  NOAH-based.  Several  researchers 
[3, 36, 37, 70] extended NOAH by improving the representation of time, in quite 
different ways. (These improvements have not been incorporated in TWEAK.) 
David Wilkins' SIPE [77, 78]  used MOLGEN-like constraints and incorporated a 
new technique for detecting clobbering. 
3.2.  Representation 
A  planner must represent events in time, actions the agent can take, and the 
world  and  the  objects  in  it.  Domain-independent  planners  all  base  their 
representations on those of STRIPS, and with the exception of the introduction 
of constraints, have not progressed much beyond that framework. Therefore, 
this section is more concerned with future than with past work. 
The rest of this section is divided into four decreasingly interesting subsec- 
tions.  The  first  discusses  action  representation;  the  second,  time;  the  third, 
codesignation constraints; and the fourth, miscellany. 
3.2.1.  Acttons 
TWEAK  has  an impoverished representation for actions; for example, it does 
not allow for indirect side-effects. Without these restrictions, the modal truth 
criterion would fail, and TWEAK would be no longer complete and perhaps not 
correct. These problems are largely a reflection of the state of the art and are 350  D  CHAPMAN 
not specific to TWEAK.  Linear planners can use more powerful acUon represen- 
tations,  but probably mcur exponentially increased  search.  Previous nonlinear 
planners  either have the same restricted  action  representation  or are incorrect 
or  incomplete  or both. 
The  restrictions  on  action  representation  make  TWEAK  almost  useless  as  a 
real-world planner.  It is barely possible to formalize the cubmal blocks world in 
this  representation;  HACKER'S  blocks  world,  with  different-sized  blocks,  can 
not  be  represented.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  I  will  explam  the  two 
major restrictions,  the  reason  the  truth  criterion  fails in  each  case,  and  some 
approaches to  planning  with  richer  action  representations. 
The action representation  does not allow the effects of actions to depend on 
the situation m  which they are applied.  Consider a blocks world in which zero, 
one,  or  two blocks can  be on  any given block.  (This example and  its analysis 
are due to David McAllester,  personal communication.) Every block still must 
be on zero or one other block.  We need a function space that takes a  block as 
an  argument  and  returns  an  integer  between  zero  and  two inclusive  that  tells 
how much room is left on top of the block. A  precondition of (puton a b) is that 
(space  b)  be  greater  than  zero,  and  the  corresponding  postcondition  ts  that 
(space  b)  be  one  less  than  before.  TWEAK  can  not  represent  this  puton;  a 
representation with conditional  postcondiuons  or postcondiuons that are func- 
tionally dependent  on  the  input  situation  could. 
If TWEAK  were  extended  to  express  this  action,  the  modal  truth  criterion 
would  fatl.  An  example  is  provided  by  a  plan  with  three  unordered  steps, 
(puton a d),  (puton b d),  and  (puton c  d),  and with  (space  d)  being  two  m  the 
initial  situation;  see Ftg  15.  A  precondition  of each step is that (space d) be at 
least  one.  Let  us  ask  whether  this  precondition  p  is  achieved  in  the  input 
situation  t of (puton a d).  According to the modal truth  criterion,  it is achieved 
so long as there is a situation t (the initial situation will do) necessarily before 
7 
{  puton d d) 
(put,m I,d) 
II,uton ,  d) 
FIG  15  A  plan that  displays synergy PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  351 
in which p  is necessarily asserted (all true) and that there is not even possibly a 
step between t  and  i that  denies p.  Candidate  clobbering steps are  (puton b d) 
and  (puton  cd);  they  are  possibly  between  t  and  t.  Does  one  deny p?  No, 
because  in  the  initial  situation  there  is  space  for  two,  and  each  step  only 
decrements  space  by one.  Yet  the  two  steps  act  synergistically to clobber p. 
This possibility is not accounted for in the modal truth criterion. 
Another restriction is that  all changes made by an action must be explicitly 
represented  as  postconditions;  many  actions  can  not  be  formalized  in  this 
representation.  For  example,  if block  b  is  on  block  a  and  we  move  a  from 
room 1 to  room  2,  b  will  also  move.  This effect could be  captured  in  an  action 
representation  in  which  deduction  was  allowed  within  situations,  so  that 
propositions logically following from postconditions would be considered true 
in  the  output  situation  of a  step.  Call  the  set  of all  propositions  that  follow 
from  another  set  the  deductive  closure  of the  second  set.  The  semantics  of 
executing a step in a situation is to negate all the propositions in the deductive 
closure of the postconditions and remove that set from the input situation, add 
the postconditions to this result, and take the deductive closure of all that. It is 
again  possible for two steps  to act synergistically to assert or deny a  proposi- 
tion: if q  A r ~  p  and one step asserts q  and the other r, together they assert p 
(equivalently deny -p).  This is the reason that TWEAK requires all propositions 
to  be  atomic.  Nonatomic  propositions  could  be  used,  but  would  be  simply 
treated as hterals; the logical operators can't get their usual semantics without 
deduction. 
There are two obvious ways of modifying the modal truth criterion to handle 
these problems of synergy. One is to consider all the completions of a plan.  In 
a  linear plan,  the state of the world is completely known at all times,  and no 
synergy is possible.  Unfortunately, there are exponenUally many linearizations 
of an  incomplete plan,  and  so  this  approach,  which  amounts  to  reverting to 
linear planning,  is not efficient. Another alternative is to consider sets of steps 
in trying to find establishers and clobberers. But again there are exponentially 
many subsets  of a  set of steps. 
Among nonlinear planners,  only SIPE allows derived effects or dependency 
of effects on the input situation of a  step.  SIPE's treatment of these features is 
incomplete and not generally correct. This is reasonable, as SIPE represents the 
state of the  art in engineering,  rather than a  formal theory of planning. 
Waldinger's planner allows for derived effects and for effects that depend on 
the  input  situation  of a  step.  Because  his  planner  is  linear,  the  problems  of 
synergy do not arise. To determine whether p  holds in the output situation of a 
step S, he asks whether it or its negation is asserted there. If not, p  is regressed 
over S. A  regression, q, is computed from p  and S such that q being true in the 
input situation of S guarantees that p  is true in the output situation.  Now the 
rule  can  be  applied  recursively  to  q  and  the  output  situation  of  the  step 
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There  are  two  difficulties with  Waldlnger's  approach.  First,  it depends  on 
linearity; in a nonlinear plan there isn't a unique step preceding S to recurse to. 
(Pednault  [41]  is  able  to extend Waldinger's technique to a  certain  restricted 
form  of nonlinearity.)  In  Section  3.2.2  I  will  suggest  that  linear  planning  is 
exponentially less efficient than nonlinear planning. 
The second problem IS that It is not obvious how to compute the regression 
of p  given a step to pass it back over. Waldinger does not address this problem; 
his  planner  apparently  was  given  specific  techniques  which  worked  only for 
particular action types. Rosenschein's planner [47] has a general procedure for 
computing regressions, which was further extended by Kautz [28, 29]  Because 
these  systems  incorporated  complete  deduction  engines,  they  proved  to  be 
unworkably inefficient. 
The  regression  formulation  makes  clearer  how  TWEAK  depends  on  the 
simplicity of its action  representation:  the essential factor is that propositions 
are  unchanged  by  regression.  Extensions  to  the  action  representation  that 
preserve  this  property  would  be  safe.  I  haven't  been  able  to  find  any such 
extensions, however. 
The  essential  difficulty with  extended  action  representation  is  the  frame 
problem  [27,35, 42].  The  frame  problem  is  traditionally  stated  as  that  of 
discovering what propositions are left unchanged by an action; this is useful in 
practice  in order to discover whether a  proposition holds in a  situation. Thus 
the frame problem  can be  viewed as that of finding an efficiently implement- 
able  truth  criterion  The  following theorem  suggests that  this may be  impos- 
sible  in general: 
Intractability  Theorem.  The problem  of determmmg  whether a proposttion  ts 
necessardy  true  in  a  nonlinear plan  whose  actton  representation  ts sufficwntly 
strong to represent conditional acttons, dependency of effects on input situattons, 
or dertved szde-effects  is NP-hard. 
A  somewhat related theorem IS the following: 
Second  Undecidability  Theorem.  Planmng  is  undecldable  even  with  a  fimte 
initial situation if the actton representation ts extended to represent actions whose 
effects are a function  of their situation. 
What are we to make of these theorems? Naively, they suggest that writing 
planners  for  extended  action  representation  is  a  quixotic  enterprise.  In  the 
conclusion to this paper,  I will make a radical suggestion in this regard. There 
are  loosely three  ways out,  however.  We  might hope  for the  best,  relax the 
correctness  requirement  on  a  planner,  or  relax  the  generality  requirement. 
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come up in practice, extensions to current planning techniques will happen to 
be  efficient.  My  intuition  is  that  this  is  not  the  case,  but  the  issue  is  an 
empirical  one.  Relaxing the  correctness requirement would produce heuristic 
planners  that  sometimes  produce  plans  that  don't  quite  work.  A  number  of 
current plannmg systems fit this category. In the remainder of this section, I'll 
discuss  the third possibility,  relaxing the generality requirement. 
I  have  examined  a  number of specific domains,  and found that for each of 
them it was easy to find an efficient truth criterion, but that these criteria were 
quite  different.  Perhaps  then  we  should  give  up  on  domain-independent 
planning:  the user of a planner must specify, together with the set of available 
actions,  truth criterm to be used. 
At  the  expense of some  scruffiness,  we  can do better.  In other work  [7],  I 
have  been  developing a  theory of intermediate  techniques,  which  are  neither 
completely general,  nor completely domain-specific.  Cognittve  cliches,  formal 
structures  occurring  in  many  domains,  have  attached  to  them  intermediate 
competence  that  ~s  specific  not  to  a  domain,  but  to  a  cliche.  Intermediate 
competence is  applied  by identifying instances  of the  associated  cliche in  the 
world.  A  cliche-based  system  has  to  know something  about  the  domain  it is 
running  in,  but ~s  still  domain-independent,  since  any cliche may show  up in 
any domain.  I  envision a  cliche-based constraint-posting planner for extended 
action  representations which  would  have truth  criteria specific to cliches that 
operators in the world might instantiate. A  planner with truth criteria for a few 
dozen cliches might well cover most interesting domains. 
For an example of planning with cliches, consider resources. An instance of 
the  resource  cliche  consists  of  a  state  variable  in  the  world  which  holds  a 
quantity  in  some  total  order,  together  with  at  least  one  consumer  operator, 
which  decreases,  relative to the order, the value of the  state variable,  and  at 
least  one  dependent  operator,  which  has  as  a  precondition  that  the  state 
variable have a value greater than some threshold. There may also be producer 
operators  that  increase  the  value  of  the  state  variable.  (I'm  using  the  term 
"resource"  differently  than  Wilkms  does.)  Resources  are  found  m  many 
domains;  puton in HACKER'S blocks world is both a consumer and a dependent 
operator of space  on any gwen block. 
Associated with the resource cliche is a truth criterion. The value of the state 
variable in a situation s is no less than its value in situation t necessarily before 
s,  minus  the  sum  of the  amounts  of decrements  due  to  consumers  possibly 
between t and s,  plus the sum of the amounts of mcrements due to producers 
necessarily between t and s.  In fact, it is often possible to prove a higher lower 
bound  than  this;  [43]  describes  a  clever polynomial  algorithm  using  network 
flow techniques  that  computes  the  exact  least  value  the  state  variable  could 
take on. 
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the precondition of a  dependent operator can be achieved, if it is not already, 
by  adding  producers  between  t  and  s,  by  constraining  consumers  possibly 
between  t  and s  to  be  before t  or after s,  or by constraining  the  amounts  of 
consumption  or production  to  be  respectively small  or large.  In  the  HACKER 
blocks  world,  adding  producers  of space  amounts  to  the  "punting"  strategy 
(see  the  discussion  of  "Strategy  Conflict  Brothers"  in  Section  3.3),  and 
increasing  the  amount  they  increase  space  by  suggests  the  "compacting" 
strategy. 
Unfortunately,  it  turns  out  that  planning  with  resources  is  NP-complete; it 
appears  as  "sequencing  to  minimize  maximum  cumulative  cost"  in  [21]. 
However,  the  polynomial  criterion  and  the  achievement  procedure  will  be 
extremely  useful  if  addmonal  domain  constraints  can  be  exploited  to  limit 
search. 
3.22.  ~me 
The representation of time is crucial to planning:  a plan is really a representa- 
tion of part of the future. The biggest advance in domain-independent conJunc- 
tive planning was probably the recognition that the time order can be partial, 
at least until execution. This observation first appears in print in [73, p  16], but 
the first implementation  was  in  NOAH. 
I  believe that  nonlinear planning  is  potentially exponentially more efficient 
than  hnear  planning.  In  an  extended  action  representation,  linear  planning 
avoids  the  potentially  exponential  amount  of work  reqmred  to  compute  the 
truth criterion; but  the same  exponential shows  up in  a  different guise  as the 
potentially exponentially greater amount of backtracking  required  to find the 
correct plan.  That more search is required for linear planners is supported by 
intuition  and  empirical  evidence,  but  has  never  been  formally  proved.  It 
appears to be tricky, because it requires dlagonahzlng over the search strategy 
of  the  linear  planner.  Thinking  about  metalevel  planning  in  attempting  the 
proof might be good for this reason. 
I  have  simplified the  representation of plans  from those  used  in  NOAH  and 
NONLIN.  Those  planners  represent  plans  as  directed  acyclic graphs  in  which 
there are many different types of nodes, only a few of which represent anything 
much.  My plans  are  simply partial orders on steps. 
Much of the post-drought planning research in the last few years has focused 
on overlapping actions  All  the old planners assume that  actions are instanta- 
neous  and  atomic;  in  the  real  world  most  actions  take  time,  and  several can 
happen at once. Steven Vere's DEVISER [70] treats actions as temporal intervals 
with  numerical  endpomts.  James  Allen  and  Johannes  Koomen's planner  [3] 
also treats actions as intervals, but ~s based on Allen's nonnumerical time logic. 
Drew McDermott  [36]  suggests  using a  t~me  logic based on branching futures 
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FORBIN  [37].  In  all  these  formulations,  several  actions  can  be  executed  in 
parallel.  It  would be  interesting to  analyze these planners in the same way I 
have  analyzed  TWEAK:  particularly,  to  find  a  provable  truth  criterion  that 
accounts for overlapping actions and to see what plan modification operations 
it  engenders.  This  has been  done  for Allen's planner  by Bruce  Donald  [14] 
Allen's time logic can represent the constraint that two actions be disjoint in 
time  without  committing to  which  order  they are  to  be  performed  in.  This 
makes  it  possible  to  defer  the  choice of declobbering  operation  further than 
can be done in TWEAK. Promotion and demotion can be combined into a single 
constraint,  which  does  not  commit to  which  is  to  be  used.  This  decrease  m 
commitment may  result  in  less  search.  Most  generally,  one  could  represent 
time  propositionally,  allowmg  general  disjunctions  between  several  possible 
constraints to be expressed.  This would trade off commitment against the cost 
of deducing facts about a  particular incomplete plan. 
Plans  are  like  programs  in  many  ways;  but  programs  have  conditionals, 
iterations, and dataflows, which domain-independent planners have not for the 
most part been able to generate. A  version of WARPLAN generated conditional 
plans [74],  as did Rosenschein's planner [47];  see the discussion in Section 3.3. 
Jeffrey Van Baalen  [69]  describes a  planner that uses numerical cost informa- 
tion to generate conditional plans. NOAH had a feature for representing simple 
iterations; however,  this representation  does not allow declobbering between 
steps inside the loop and steps outside, and so can not be called conjunctive. 
The  Programmer's  Apprentice  [44, 45]  uses  a  "plan  calculus"  historically 
derived  in  part  from  NOAH,  which  can  represent  conditionals,  loops,  and 
dataflow.  Amy Lansky [31, 32]  describes  GEM,  a  plan representation  derived 
from  studies  of concurrent  programming  systems,  which  can  express  a  con- 
straint  such  as  "customers  are  served  in  the  order  in  which  they  make 
requests"  which is  difficult in  other  representations.  No  program  synthesizer 
has  yet  been  written  using  the  Programmer's  Apprentice  representation;  a 
planner for GEM is now under construction. 
3.2.3.  Codesignation  constraints 
MOLGEN was the  first planner  to  highlight the use of constraints;  its  author, 
Stefik, introduced the term  "constraint posting."  Constraints in MOLGEN are 
arbitrary  predicates  possibly  on  several  variables.  MOLGEN  performs  three 
operations  on  constraints:  formulation, propagation,  and establishment.  For- 
mulation  is  making new  constraints,  propagation  creates  new from  old  con- 
straints, and establishment is binding variables to values. MOLGEN was the first 
planner  to  do  propagation;  unfortunately its  propagation  techniques  are  do- 
main-dependent  and  not  even  described  Stefik  describes  a  "build  or  buy 
decision" in achieving a  goal involving a  variable:  either one can bind it to a 
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("build").  In  this  case  it  is  often  necessary  to  introduce  new  steps  whose 
postconditions  involve  the  constant,  so  as  to  guarantee  properties  of  it 
MOLGEN was first  to introduce  new  steps  to  satisfy a  constraint. 
It is httle recognized that HACKER used codeslgnation constraints  They were 
implemented  as  specml  type  preconditions  on  varmbles.  HACKER'S  clever 
techmques  for achieving goals with  variables  make  use  of the  CONNIVER [59] 
context  mechamsm  and  have  not  been  duplicated  since.  However,  only  the 
"buy" opuon was considered,  and it  is not clear how general the  ~mplementa- 
tion was. 
SIPE'S constraints are modeled on MOLGEN'S.  SIPE'S truth criterion takes into 
account possible truths resulting from possibly codeslgnatmg propositions. Like 
TWEAK,  SIPE propagates constraints  only wa  a  codes~gnaUon relation. 
TWEAK uses  only  codesignaUon constraints,  because  preconditions  already 
can  represent  predicates  on  variables,  so  that  there  is  httle  loss  m  expresswe 
power.  If one  looks  at  the  way  constraints  are  used  m  planning,  almost  all 
constraints correspond very naturally to precondmons of steps  There are some 
excepUons to  this  m  MOLGEN,  all  of them constraints  that  have  been  created 
wa  propagation.  Stefik's  build  or  buy  decision  translates  in  the  TWEAK 
framework into  step  addition  versus  simple  achievement.  Since  preconditions 
are associated with times, predicates on variables are also; this solves problems 
MOLGEN had with  time  representaUon. 
The difference m  expresswe  power between MOLGEN or SIPE and TWEAK is 
that TWEAK cannot restrict the range of a varmble to a finite set  There are two 
reasons  I  haven't  put  range  restncUons  into  TWEAK:  because  constraint 
computaUons  then  become  NP-complete  (proof  by  reduction  from  graph 
coloring), and more seriously because the  truth  criterion fails ff I allow them. 
The "pathological" plan m  Fig.  16 illustrates the problem. Here the codesigna- 
tion constraint and the range constraints together reqmre that either x codes~g- 
nate  with  a  and  y  with  b,  or  wce  versa;  either  way  (p a b)  holds  in  the  final 
situation.  Yet  (p a b)  ~s  not necessarily asserted  by any parUcular  step. 
Variables  are  needed  m  the  blocks  world  in  which  they  originated  for  a 
"deep"  reason.  In  [5]  I  describe  a  problem  solver  that  uses  a  TWEAK-like 
planner  as  a  subroutine.  This problem solver views puton as  both a  POp and a 
PUSH. Towers can be seen as stacks, moving a block from one tower to another 
PoPs the first and PUSHes the  second.  It is the PUSH aspect that is exploited m 
achieving on goals, and the POP aspect that ~s exploited in achieving clear goals 
When  puton  is  viewed  as  a  POP, there  is  no  explanation  of what  the  second 
argument (the place to put the block moved) is for. So the problem solver uses 
X~',' 
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a  variable  to  leave  the  second  argument  unspecified.  Whatever  value  the 
second argument takes on, the puton acts as a  POP. 
3.2.4.  Other problems for future research 
A  1972 paper by Fikes, Hart, and Nilsson [19] lists a number of open research 
areas in planning. Most are still  virtually untouched. 
Representations  of the  world using nonassertional datastructures  are  sim- 
pler,  more  efficient,  and  better  reflect  its  structure  than  the  assertional 
databases used in current domain-independent planners. Many domain-specific 
planners use such representations effectively, and I see no inherent difficulty in 
using  such  simulation  structures  in  linear  domain-independent planning.  In 
constraint-posting planning the state of the world is not completely defined at 
all  times; this is easy to implement using asseruonal databases, m  which ~t ~s 
easy to represent unknown truth values. It is much harder to represent partial 
knowledge with nonasseruonal datastructures. One approach to this problem is 
outlined in [48]. This or perhaps a hybrid techmque, using both assertions and 
more direct representations, may lead to s~mpler,  more powerful and efficient 
planners. 
In  most  real-world  domains  actions  can  have  any  of  several  outcomes, 
depending  on  factors that  the  agent  does  not  or  cannot  know,  or  even  on 
genuinely random factors.  Effectively, they are  nondeterministic. There  has 
been almost no work on planning in such domains. A related open problem is 
coping  with  events  that  are  not  planned for.  These  might be  the  actions of 
other agents or spontaneous physical happenings. DEVISER and Allen's planner 
can plan around "scheduled" unplanned events: these are specific  events that 
will  occur at  known times.  Many problem solvers have plan executives that, 
when unexpected events occur, call the planner to derive a new plan from the 
altered state of the world; [79], for example. In the real world, which has tigers 
in  it,  that  isn't good  enough;  you have  to  prepare  for contingencies during 
planning. Such plans need conditionals. Another area of current research is in 
planning for multiple agents or multiple effectors that have to be synchronized 
[19, 20, 46]. 
3.3.  Making  a  plan  achieve  a  goal 
In this section, I treat first linear planners and then nonlinear planners. That 
isn't  quite  the  chronological order,  as  some  linear planners postdate NOAH. 
There are two interesting points to the section: one is the way the individual 
plan modification operations were developed by generalization, splitting, and 
merging. The other is to see that all conjunctive domain-independent planners 
work  in  substantially the  same  way,  though they look very different, using 
apparently unrelated datastructures and algorithms. As time went by, features 
were added and alternative implementations were tried, but the fundamentals 358  I)  CHAPMAN 
are  unchanged  from  HACKER  down  to  TWEAK  This  has  not  been  generally 
realized, even by the people who wrote the planners. Forcing all the algorithms 
into  the  vocabulary  of TWEAK  modification  operations  makes  them  easy  to 
compare  However,  many  of the  early  planning  papers  are  very difficult  to 
read,  and  some  of  what  follows  may  be  inaccurate  in  detail.  Figure  17 
summarizes the section, illustrating which parts of the achievement procedure 
were invented when 
The most  important  thing  to  understand  about  linear  planners  is  that  they 
work  just  the  same  way  as  nonlinear  ones,  except that  the  representation  is 
awkward.  The  basic  operation  of  all  the  linear  planners  is  analogous  to 
promotion.  In  a  nonlinear  planner  this  lUSt adds  temporal  constraints,  in  a 
linear planner,  a  step must  be picked up and  moved to a  different position in 
the plan. 
There are two different versions of promotion that appear in linear planners. 
The  first,  mdtvtdual promotion,  moves  the  clobberer forward  over the  clob- 
beree  (Alternatively,  the  clobberee  could  be  moved  backward  before  the 
clobberer;  this is  an  uninterestingly different operation.)  In  a  nonlinear plan- 
ner, promotion automatically also puts everything before the clobberee before 
the  clobberer  and  vice  versa,  individual  promotion  doesn't  generally  do  so, 
with the result that a step can be separated from the steps that were to achieve 
its preconditions, so that they must be reachieved. Block promotton moves the 
clobberer, together with the steps that achieve its preconditions, and the steps 
that  achieve their preconditions, transitively, as a  block  This implies a strong 
lineartty assumptton: not only that the plan can be totally ordered, but also that 
if you have goals g  and h  and S achieves g and  T achieves h  and S is before T, 
then all  the  steps  that  achieve preconditions of S  are before all the steps  that 
achieve preconditions  of  T.  In  other words,  the  time  order must  respect  the 
subgoahng  hierarchy.  Using  only  block  promotion,  it  is  impossible  to  solve 
optimally the  Sussman  anomaly problem.  The optimal solution involves three 
steps:  (puton  c  table),  (puton  b c),  (puton  a b).  This  plan  violates  the  strong 
hnearlty assumption: the first step achieves the precondition (clear a) for the last 
(NONLIN 77) 
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~  2ofo,~p~ne  w  W//  "3r--p~,q:=~p~r  (TWEAK85) 
(HACKER 73)  separatmn 
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step, but the middle step is not achieving a precondition of the last, but rather 
one of the top-level goals. 
HACKER has,  in effect, four plan  modification operations.  Step  addition is 
used  initially  on  each  of  the  conjunct  goals,  and  the  resulting  steps  are 
arbitrarily linearly ordered. HACKER  recognizes four bug types, each of which 
has  a  corresponding plan modification operation.  "Prerequisite Missing" is  a 
precondition that is not true anywhere before it is needed, and is patched with 
step  addition.  "Prereqmsite  Clobbers  Brother  Goal"  is  just clobbering,  and 
block  promotion  is  apphed.  "Prerequisite  Conflict  Brothers"  is  a  "double 
cross":  a  pair of steps each of which clobbers the other.  HACKER has a  plan 
modification operation for this which does not appear m  any other planner: a 
RESOLVE expert is called, which replaces the two steps with a single step that 
achieves  all  the  goals  the  two  steps  together  were  intended  to  achieve.  In 
practice,  it seems that the only cases the RESOLVE expert could handle were 
pairs of steps that achieved the goals (spacefor a c) and (spacefor b c) (Sussman's 
blocks world allows more than one block on a given block). The expert would 
replace the two steps with a subplan that achieved (spacefor (both a b)e). 
HACKER had many other nifty planning techniques that somehow got lost in 
the sands of time. For example, HACKER's addition operation is different from 
those of all subsequent planners.  Addition in later planners uses  one of the 
possibly several steps that could achieve a  goal, perhaps saving the others as 
backtrack alternatives.  HACKER doesn't backtrack, but it does add the alter- 
nate steps in later when one doesn't work. This leads to the fourth bug type, 
"Strategy  Conflict  Brothers,"  in  which  a  step  in  one  strategy  (alternative 
achieving step) clobbers a precondition of another, later strategy. In this case, 
HACKER  applies  promotion.  This  "multiple  addition"  operation  has  many 
interesting properties.  The principal use of it is m  achieving (spacefor a b); the 
two strategies are  "compacting" the blocks on top of b and "punting" blocks 
off of b that don't need to be there.  Although either of these strategies may 
achieve an unachleved spacefor  goal, neither is guaranteed to. Yet, if executed 
in the right order (punt then compact), they make spaee if it is possible to do 
so. This sort of synergy and partial goal fulfillment has never been duplicated. 
Sussman called Allen Brown's problem "anomalous" because it could not be 
solved using block promotion. He presents a solution using individual promo- 
tion,  but  regards  this  as  a  "hack."  Why?  Sussman  viewed  HACKER as  an 
automatic programming system, constructing programs, not plans. A  conjunc- 
tion (of the original goals or of the preconditions to a step) is achieved via a 
single subroutine. Promotion in HACKER was confined to permuting the order 
of lines of a  subroutine;  this  amounts to block promotion, since subroutines 
encapsulate the subgoal hierarchy. In order to solve the Sussman anomaly, one 
must  move  program  steps  across  subroutine  boundaries,  which  HACKER 
wouldn't do. 
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lost in the shuffle  HACKER's  performance In any given domain would improve 
as  time  went  by,  because  the  programs  it  wrote  could  be  reused  on  new 
problems  Sussman  describes  techniques  for generalization  and  subroutinlza- 
tlon of programs so that  less planning would need to be done later  Compila- 
tion  can  be  viewed  as  constant-folding  the  source  code  into  the  interpreter; 
HACKER  in  effect  constant-folded  classes  of  problems  into  the  planner.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  build  a  problem  solver  that  constant-folded  into 
TWEAK,  and  incorporated what  has  been  learned  in  the  past  ten  years  about 
generahzatlon. 
WARPLAN  has  two  plan  modification  operations,  step  addition  and  an 
operation that combines addition with individual promotion. The latter opera- 
tlon  ("regression")  is  to  find  a  step  that  achieves  the  goal,  then  to  search 
backward  from  the  end  for  a  place  in  the  plan  where  the  step  can  be  put 
without being clobbered.  WARPLAN was  able to solve the anomalous problem 
because it doesn't make the strong linearity assumption;  it represents plans  as 
flat orders, without hierarchy. 
Waldrlnger [72]  generalizes Warren's technique by allowing the regression of 
a goal to be computed from the step it is being moved back over (as described 
In  Section 3 2.1). 
INTERPLAN has  three  plan  modification operations:  step  addition  and  both 
versions of promotion  (not combined with  addition). 
Rosenschein  [47]  describes  a  linear  planner  that  uses  both  promotion  and 
demotion.  He  also  has  an  operation for introducing conditionals  (if-then-else 
branches)  into  plans:  it  chooses  an  arbitrary  proposition  not  provable  or 
disprovable from the initial situation,  and puts a  branch on this proposition at 
the beginning of the plan  In unpublished work he has improved this technique 
so that  the condition to branch  on can  be found deterministically 
With  NOAH  comes  the  great  explosion  in  the  set  of  plan  modification 
operations  NOAH classifies clobberings into three classes: in the first, two steps 
each clobber the other (a "double cross"); m the second, the clobberer and the 
clobberee  are  unordered;  and  m  the  third,  the  clobberer  is  before  the 
clobberee.  The  case  (an  "'n-cross")  m  which  a  set  of more  than  two  steps 
clobber  each  other,  arranged  m  a  cycle,  is  neglected.  I  don't  understand 
Sacerdoti's  explanation  of  the  plan  modification  operation  to  patch  double 
crosses;  ~t  seems  to  be  a  version  of  step  addition,  possibly  combined  with 
separation  The other two cases are handled by promotion and demotion with 
the  addition  of a  white  knight  step,  respectively. 
"Eliminate  Redundant  Preconditions"  is  a  step  removal  operation.  Step 
removal is  useful because  NOAH  does not have a  simple establishment opera- 
tion  Thus, if two steps have the same precondition, they may both be achieved 
by addition,  and  then one of the two steps  removed.  "Use Existing Objects" 
binds variables to constants.  Sacerdotl is very unclear on when ~t is applied and 
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for achieving a disjunctive goal.  Each of the disjuncts is planned for, until it is 
clear that one can be achieved; then an operation is applied that removes the 
plan fragments for the other disjuncts. 
Sacerdoti  presents  two  "task-specific"  plan  modification operations.  "Tool 
Gathering"  optimizes  plans  relative  to  a  notion  of  the  cost  of  performing 
correct plans:  a  correct plan  may be  made  into  a  better,  still  correct one  by 
some  reorderings.  "Limitations of an  Apprentice"  compensates for the  inex- 
pressibility in his action representation of many kinds of actions. The example 
he  gwes  is  very  similar  (a  resource  conflict,  requiring  a  global  view  to  do 
declobbermg) to the blocks world example I  analyze in Section 3.2.1.  Unfortu- 
nately, the details of the operation are  not given. 
NONLIN was the first planner to use simple estabhshment.  NONLIN also uses 
addition,  promotion, and  demotion. 
SIPE introduced  no  new  modification  operations,  but  it  does  have  a  new 
technique for detecting clobbering. A  particularly common sort of precondition 
is  what  Wilkins  terms  a  resource:  a  binary  variable  that  must  be  set  to  one 
value  ("available")  for an  operation  to  be  applicable,  and  which  is  set  to  a 
different value during the operation, then "released" or reset at the end. Two 
unordered steps that try to use the same resource clobber each other; SIPE then 
applies promotion. The techniques SIPE uses for resource clobbering detection 
are only heuristic;  more work is needed to understand this maneuver. 
Separation  as  a  plan  modification  operation  may appear  first  in  TWEAK.  I 
suspect that NOAH's double cross removal operation, which I don't understand, 
may combine step addition with separation; apart from this, there seems to be 
no precedent. 
TWEAK is the first planner to use declobbering by white knight in the general 
case in which the white knight is distinct from the establishing situation t. This 
maneuver is  actually pretty useless,  because  either the white  knight will  turn 
out to assert the goal,  in which case we'd have done as well to use its output 
situation as an establisher, or else it won't, in which case we might as well have 
used separation to defeat the clobberer. The only possible advantage is slightly 
less commitment, and so possibly a little less backtracking. This plan modifica- 
tion, like all the others, falls out of interpreting the modal truth criterion as a 
nondeterministic procedure, and corresponds to the necessarily but odd clause 
about white knights.  My implementation never actually uses it. 
Because the modal truth criterion is sufficient as well as necessary, there are 
no more plan modification operations possible without extending the range of 
represented actions.  Once that is done, new operations will be possible; again 
they can  be  derived from the  truth  criteria for the  new  representations.  For 
example,  the  pathological  plan  illustrated  in  Section 3 2.3  suggests  an opera- 
tion of "establishment by separation":  if the plan  did not have the constraint 
x #  y,  adding  this  constraint  would  achieve  p  in  the  final  situation.  If  the 
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tlon ("simultaneous establishment")  is possible.  In this case, two actions must 
be performed simultaneously to achieve a  result. 
Kristian  Hammond  [22]  describes  WOK,  a  planner which  although  domain- 
specific and nonconjunctlve has interesting things to say about goal interactions 
(the class of effects that includes clobbering). WOK achieves goals by introduc- 
ing  interactions  of known  sorts.  This  is  the  antithesis  of the  linear  strategy: 
rather than  assuming as  a  first approximation that goals don't interact,  syner- 
gistic interactions are used as a basic tool for achieving goals.  It is unclear how 
this  approach  can  be  applied  to conjunctive planning,  but  it  may be  a  useful 
line of future research.  [76]  also describes constructive use of goal interactions 
3.4.  The  top-level  control structure 
The top-level control structure of almost  every domain-independent conjunc- 
tive  planner  is  search  Search  control  is  the  aspect  of  domain-independent 
conjunctive planning  that  is  understood  least.  Most  of the  domains  to  which 
domain-independent  conjunctive planning  has  been applied have been forgiv- 
ing:  if more than one plan modification operation is applicable to a clobbering 
or unestablished goal,  any of the possibilities will probably do  Thus,  it hasn't 
been necessary to devote a lot of thought to which to choose  However, m  real 
domains  the  choices  probably  are  critical,  and  a  lot  of  schemes  have  been 
proposed  for making  them.  Since  none of these  has  been  adequately tested, 
little is  known  about which  is  best. 
Almost  every planner has  a  distinct  control structure  I've loosely grouped 
them  in  eight  classes,  ordered  roughly by the  complexity of the backtracking 
algorithm  The classes are no backtracking, explicitly represented alternatives, 
dependency-directed  modification,  chronological  backtracking,  dependency- 
directed backtracking, heuristic search, metaplanning,  and protection. Many of 
the planners  I  discuss  actually fit into several of these  classes. 
The simplest control structure avoids backtracking altogether  Plan modifica- 
tion  operations  are  applied  m  a  fixed order according to fixed criteria until  a 
correct plan is found or it is no longer possible to apply operations  This is not 
as  bad  as  it sounds,  because  you can  usually  make  a  good guess  as  to which 
modification operation to apply: usually, one should prefer simple achievement 
to step addition,  for example.  HACKER uses this approach.  NOAH comes very 
close;  it  backs  up  only  from  alternative  choices  of  variable  bindings.  That 
NOAH solved several difficult problems shows that  search strategy is unimpor- 
tant  m  some  domains 
A  very simple  solution  to  the  problem  of which  modification operation  to 
apply is to choose all  applicable  ones, splitting the plan into several explicitly 
represented  copies.  No  planner  fits  altogether  in  this  class  as  it  is  very 
inefficient in general  If some additional principle decides whether for a  given 
choice to  use  this  technique  or  to  use  search,  the  splitting  technique  may be PLANNING  FOR CONJUNCTIVE  GOALS  363 
useful. SIPE and a planning framework described by Barbara Hayes-Roth et al. 
[24]  take this approach. 
The simplest backtracking scheme is chronological: when a choice has to be 
made, one is chosen by some means and the others are saved away. If the plan 
cannot be  extended to a  solution by further modification, failure is signalled. 
The most recent choice point is backed up to, and an alternative for the choice 
is used  When no choices remain, the next most recent choice point is backed 
up  to,  and  so  on.  WARPLAN,  INTERPLAN,  and  SIPE use  chronological  back- 
tracking. 
Chronological backtracking can result m the exploration of more blind alleys 
than necessary.  Dependency-directed backtracking backs  up  at failure not to 
the  most  recent  choice  point,  but  to  one  responsible  for  the  failure.  For  a 
discussion  of dependency-directed backtracking  in  general,  see  [15, 53].  The 
first planner to use dependency-direction was Hayes' 1975  route planner [23], 
which  was  not  conjunctive.  Hayes  used  backtracking  to  recover  only  from 
execution error,  rather than from planning error (dead ends) as does TWEAK, 
although he explicitly considered the latter possibility. Thus his implemented 
control  structure  can  be  termed  "dependency-directed  modification"  rather 
than  backtracking.  Hayes'  conception  of  dependency-directed  backtracking 
predates  and  seems  to  be  independent  of  its  discovery  by  Stallman  and 
Sussman [53],  to whom it is usually credited. 
Daniel  [11]  added dependency-directed backtracking to NONLIN. The same 
year  de  Kleer  et  al.  [12]  described  a  dependency-directed  linear  planner. 
London's planner [33] represents plans and world states using a TMS, the utility 
underlying dependency-directed backtracking, but apparently does not use the 
TMS for backtracking. 
Heuristic  search  uses  some  numerical  estimate  of  "goodness"  to  decide 
which order to try choices in. INTERPLAN and NONLIN use heuristics to control 
their chronological search. Since making a wrong choice can result in searching 
a  large dead-end subtree, it would be nice to eliminate wrong choices without 
having to explore their consequences. Kibler and Morris [30] present a control 
scheme based on negative search heuristics that prune  obviously bad choices. 
However,  these  heuristics  are  domain-specific for the  blocks  world.  Siklossy 
and  Roach  [52]  use  a  similar  strategy.  Corkill  [9]  describes  a  NOAH-like 
planner  in  which  control  is  distributed  among  several  message-passing  pro- 
cessors. 
All  the  control  structures  discussed  so  far  (with  the  possible  exception  of 
heuristic search) are "syntactic": they don't depend on the specifics of the plan 
being constructed, but blindly apply some simple algorithm for choosing among 
alternatives without considering what those alternatives are.  Since control of 
planning  is  very  hard,  such  methods  may  be  inherently  weak;  perhaps  we 
should apply the full power of a  problem solver to choosing what to do next. 
This  is  the  metaplanning approach.  There  is  an  increasing  literature  on  this 364  D  CHAPMAN 
[4, 10, 16, 55, 75, 76]  most  of which  is  very vague.  I'll  discuss  just  two  meta- 
planning  systems.  Doyle's  unimplemented  SEAN uses  (another  copy  of)  the 
same  planner  to  do  metaplannmg  as  to  do  planning  about  the  domain.  The 
metaplanner in turn is controlled by an identical metametaplanner and so on; 
Doyle discusses  ways to implement this  apparently infinite regress 
MOLGEN has  only one  level of metaplannlng,  and  the  metaplanner  is  quite 
unlike  the  domain-level  planner.  The  domain-level  planner  creates  plans  for 
MOLGEN'S  domain,  genetics  expemment  planning.  It  has  operations  that  are 
analogous to the plan modification operations of TWEAK  These operations are 
selected by a  metaplanner which chooses among plan modification operations. 
The metaplanner is very simple; it's perhaps exaggerated to call it a planner at 
all 
The idea of using a  copy of TWEAK as a  metaplanner ~s attractive,  the plan 
modification operations can be thought of as having well-defined preconditions 
(that the constraints they impose  not conflict with the existing ones, or that  a 
suitable step exists to achieve a goal in the case of addition) and postcondltlOnS 
(the  insertion  of the  new  constraint  or step).  Unfortunately, TWEAK's  action 
representation is too weak  to represent the plan  modification operations 
Protectton is  a  techmque  introduced  in  HACKER;  it guarantees  that  once a 
goal  has  been  achieved,  it  stays  achieved  Protection has  not  generally been 
seen as a  search strategy, but is perhaps best viewed that way.  Each time the 
goal achievement procedure is applied successfully, the achieved goal is stored 
in a protection list  This list consulted in future applications of the procedure; if 
the procedure would unachieve a protected goal as a side-effect of achieving a 
new goal, backtracking is invoked. Protection significantly decreases the size of 
the  search  space,  but  it  is  often  overly  strict  and  can  result  in  excessive 
backtracking.  Vere [71]  describes "splicing," a technique which relaxes protec- 
tion when it has  caused a  deadlock. 
Planners can  be  classified  along a  dimension orthogonal to search strategy, 
that  of techmque  used  to  recover from  execution failures.  This  isn't  part  of 
planning  proper,  but  many  systems  interleave  planning  with  (simulated  or 
actual)  execution  so  that  effectively  a  nonbacktracklng  planner  performs 
search, failing during execution rather than planning,  and then returning to the 
planner  to  obtain  a  new  plan  to recover.  HACKER  USeS this  approach.  NOAH 
proper  doesn't,  but  its  planner  ~s  connected  to  an  execution  system  that 
reinvokes the planner after execution failure, so that the system as a whole can 
be  put  in  th~s class.  HACKER  makes  use  of CONNIVER techniques  s~milar  to 
dependency-direction  in  order  to  figure  out  which  planning  decision  was 
responsible for the failure and  to try another alternative in  the choice. 
Planning and AI language design have strongly influenced each other. Many 
of the planners that do search inherit their search discipline from the language 
they were wmtten in,  and many AI languages  were designed to make  writing 
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language  for  writing  planners  in;  it  was  the  first  to  supply  backtracking 
automatically.  HACKER and  BUILD,  a  clever  domain-specific  blocks  world 
planner [17], were written in and depend heavily on the abilities of CONNIVER 
[59].  CONNIVER  was written in reaction to the  difficulties with chronological 
backtracking  in  PLANNER. WARPLAN inherits  its  search  from  PROLOG. The 
planner of de Kleer et al. was the first program written in AMORD, and inherits 
its  dependency-directed backtracking from AMORD's TMS  [13]. TWEAK, too, 
inherits its dependency-directed backtrackmg from Dependency-Directed LISP, 
a language specifically designed for TWEAK. DDL looks like ordinary LISP but 
has an implicit dependency-directed backtracking control structure.  It will be 
described in a forthcoming paper. 
4.  Conclusions 
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is the introduction of the 
notion of a  provably correct modal truth criterion and its use in the correct- 
ness/completeness proof. The first such correctness argument is given on [60, 
p. 100]; although it is very loose, my proof clearly descends from it. A series of 
five  papers,  [73,  72,  47,  29,  41],  building  on  each  other,  rigorously prove 
correctness of linear planners.  Those papers  were motivated by many of the 
same  considerations as  this  one:  rigor  requires  simplicity, guarantees  agree- 
ment  about  details,  can  unveil  problems  and  suggest  solutions.  Thus  these 
papers form the neat part of the scruffy-neat research cycle for linear planning. 
The neat part of the cycle for nonlinear planning begins with this paper. 
Yet I wonder about the psychological reality of this sort of planning. It may 
be  that the only solutions to the frame problem we can devise are  heuristic. 
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  humans solve  problems  by improvisation, 
doing something easy and debugging the  result when it fails [58]. Sussman's 
HACKER worked that way; unfortunately the set of bugs that it could patch are 
ones that TWEAK never introduces, and so  his specific  debugging techniques 
are  of no  use.  [1]  describes  the  beginning of research  on  improvisation.  [8] 
gives a theory of planning as a derivative activity, taking situated activity as the 
primary  phenomenon.  [2]  (in  preparation)  describes  in  detail  a  theory  of 
situated activity that does not involve planning. 
Appendix A.  Proofs 
A.I.  The modal truth criterion 
I  prove  the  criterion in  three  steps.  First,  I  prove  the  time's  arrow  lemma, 
which says that only the steps executed before a situation are relevant to what 
is true in that situation. Time does not flow backward.  I use the time's arrow 
lemma to prove  a  truth criterion for complete plans that is analogous to the 366  D  CHAPMAN 
modal truth criterion.  I use that and a series of lemmas about consistent sets oI 
constraints to prove the  modal truth  criterion.  All these proofs except the  last 
are  by  numerical  Induction.  The  proof  of the  modal  truth  criterion  is  more 
interesting;  in  it  I  construct  specific  completions  of plans  that  satisfy various 
conditions 
Time's Arrow  Lemma.  Let  ~  and  ~  be  complete plans  whose  tmtial situation 
and first n  steps are identical.  A  proposition p  Is true in the Initial sttuanon or the 
mput  or  output  sttuatton  of  one  of'  the first  n  steps  of  ~  lff it  ts  true  tn  the 
corresponding  sttuanon  m  °'9 
Proof.  By  induction  on  n.  If  ~  and  ~  have  no  steps,  they  have  only  one 
situation,  which  is both  initial  and  final,  and  the  same in  both.  Certainly p  is 
true  in  this  situation  in  ~  if  it  ~s  true  in  the  corresponding  situation  in  ~. 
Suppose  now that  the  lemma is true  for plans whose  initial  situation  and  first 
n-1  steps  are  identical;  I  will  show  that  it  holds  for  plans  whose  initial 
situation  and first n  steps are identical.  Let ~  and ~  be such plans;  they have 
the  first n -  1 steps identical,  and  by the induction  hypotheses p  is true in the 
initial  situation  and the  input  and output situations  of the first n -  1 situations 
of  ??  lff p  is  true  in  the  corresponding  situation  of  ~.  The  only  remaining 
situation  we  need  check  is  the  output  situation  s  of  the  nth  step  S.  By 
definition, s is the input situation of S minus any propositions denied by S, plus 
any propositions asserted by S.  If p  is neither asserted nor denied by S, then it 
is true in s  just in case it is true in the input situation of the analogous step of 
~.  If p  is asserted or denied by S, it is also asserted or denied by the analogous 
step in ~  and so again is true in s iff it is true in the output situation of the nth 
step of 5L  By induction,  then,  the  lemma holds for  any n.  [] 
Truth Criterion for Complete Plans.  In a  complete plan,  a proposttion p  ts true 
in  a  situattons  tff there  extsts a  sttuatton  t previous  or equal  to s  m  which p  ts 
asserted  and  such  that there  ts  no  step  between  t  and  s  whtch  denies p. 
Proof.  It should  be  obvious that  this  criterion  is  correct.  Informally, we  start 
with  the  initial  situation  and  at  each  step  delete  from the  set  of propositions 
representing the world what is denied  by the step and add what is asserted by 
~t.  Everything else is preserved untouched. 
A  rigorous proof again uses induction on the length of plans.  A  plan with no 
steps has only an initial  and a  final situation,  and the two contain the same set 
of propositions.  A  proposition  is true  in the  initial  situation iff it codesignates 
with  something  in  the  initial  situation,  in  which  case  it  is  asserted  there.  A 
proposmon is true  in  the  final situation  iff it is true  in  the  initial  situation.  In 
both  cases,  there  is no possibility of an intervening  denying  step 
Suppose now that the criterion is correct for complete plans of length n -  1; I PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  367 
will show that it is correct for complete plans of length n.  Let ~  be a  plan of 
length n, fthe  final situation of ~, S the last step in ~, t be the input situation 
of S,  and ~  the plan of length n -  1 derived by removing S  from ~;  see  Fig. 
A.1.  p  is  true  in  a  situation  in  3  ~ other  than f  just  in  case p  is  true  in  the 
corresponding  situation  of  5~,  by  the  time's  arrow  lemma.  Then  by  the 
mductlon  hypothesis,  the  criterion  holds  for  every  proposition  and  every 
situation  in  ~  except perhaps f  (which contains  the  same  propositions  as  the 
output  situation  of  S).  f  is  by  definition  i  minus  things  denied  by  S  plus 
whatever is asserted by S.  Thus p  is true in f  iff it is asserted by S or true in i 
and  not  denied  by S.  In  the  former case, p  is  asserted  in f  and  no  step  can 
intervene, so the criterion holds. In the latter, by induction there is a situation t 
in which p  is asserted and no step between t and i which denies p, and since S 
does not deny p, there is also no step between t and f  that demes p. This same t 
is before f,  so the criterion is satisfied.  The converse is trivial:  if the criterion 
holds,  either p  is  asserted  in f  or it is true in t  and not denied by S.  [] 
I  will  next  state  and  give  only proof sketches  for  three  technical  lemmas 
needed in the proof of the modal truth criterion. 
Temporal Consistency Lemma.  If s  ts  a  situation  and  {t,}  is  a finite  set  of 
sttuattons such that for each i, s is possibly before t,, then possibly s is before all 
the t , . 
Proof.  By  induction  on  the  size  of  {t,}.  The  main  step  is  to  see  that 
constraining  s <  tj for some j  leaves  all  the  other s <  t, possible.  For s <  tj to 
make s <  t, impossible,  it would have to make t, < s  necessary.  But, from the 
definition of the time order, from s <  tj together with the previous constraints, 
there  follow only constraints  of the  form  a <  b,  where  a ~< s  and  tj ~< b.  [] 
Codesignation Consistency Lemma.  ff {v,}  is  a fimte  set of vartables  none  of 
which  is  constrained  to  codesignate  with any  constant,  you  can  assign  to  each 
equtvalence  class  (under  the  codesignation  relation)  a  distinct  "gensymmed" 
constant  not previously  appearing  in  the plan,  and constrain  codesignation  of 
these constants  with the  variables  in  their respective  classes. 
n-  1 steps 
,A 
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Proof. There are enough constants because only finitely many of the mfimte set 
can be mentioned in a plan.  Since the gensymmed constants are not mentioned 
in the plan,  they cannot have been constrained to not codesignate with any of 
the variables. Since the  { v,} do not codesignate with any constants, there is no 
problem of distinct constants  being constrained to codeslgnate.  [] 
Noncodesignation Consistency Lemma. If p  is a propositton  and  { q, } is a fintte 
set  of propositions  such  that for  all  l  posstbly  q, 4~ p,  then  posstbly  for  all  t 
q,+P. 
Proof. Again by induction, on the size of {q,}. p  and q, are constrained to not 
codesignate by constraining some  pair of elements to not codesignate.  I  must 
show that doing so does not make p  and some q, necessarily codeslgnate. This 
is because the definition of the codesignation relation is such that a codesigna- 
tlon of elements cannot be made to follow by adding a  noncodeslgnation  [] 
Modal Truth Criterion.  A  proposmon p  is necessartly true m a sttuattons tff two 
conditions hold:  there ts a sttuation t equal or necessarily previous to s in which 
p  ts  necessarily  asserted,  and  for  every  step  C  possibly  before  s  and  every 
propositton  q  possibly  codeslgnating  with p  whtch  C  dentes,  there ts  a step  W 
necessartly  between  C  and  s  which  asserts  r,  a proposttion  such  that  r  and p 
codesignate  whenever p  and  q  codesignate.  The  criterton for possible  truth  is 
exactly  analogous,  with  all  the  modalittes  switched  (read  "necessary"  for 
"posstble"  and  vtce  versa) 
Proof.  David  McAllester  helped  debug  and  simplify  this  proof.  I'll  give  the 
proof for necessary truth; possible truth follows by modal duality  Refer to Fig. 
6  for a  diagram  of the  necessary truth criterion. 
The proof comes in three parts.  The first two parts show the necessary truth 
of the proposition p  implies the existence of an establisher and the absence of a 
clobberer.  I  do  this  by  proving  the  contrapositive,  that  the  absence  of 
establisher or the presence of a clobberer ensures that p  is not necessarily true. 
First I show that if there is no establisher, then p  is not necessarily true. Then I 
show that if there is a clobberer, p  is again not necessarily true. The third part 
of  the  proof  shows  the  implication  in  the  other  direction:  if  there  is  an 
estabhsher and no clobberer, p  is necessarily true. The basic proof technique is 
constructive  for  each  of  these  cases,  I  show  how  to  construct  a  specific 
completion  of  the  given  incomplete  plan  in  which  the  truth  criterion  for 
complete plans  can be used to show that p  is  (or is not) true  in s 
In  the  case  where  there  is  no  establisher,  to  construct  the  completion 
falsifying p  m  s, first add constraints that put after s every step possibly after s. 
This can be done, by the temporal consistency lemma. The next step is to apply 
the codeslgnaUon consistency lemma and constrain every equivalence class of 
variables  that  is  not  already  constrained  to  codesignate  with  some  specific 
constant  to codesignate with  a  distinct  "gensymmed" constant.  A  completion PLANNING  FOR  CONJUNCTIVE  GOALS  369 
in which p  is not true  in s  is made  by taking  any completion of this modified 
plan.  In the original incomplete plan there was no step that necessarily asserts 
p  and that is necessarily before s; and any step that only possibly asserted p  has 
been  made  not  to  assert  it  (but  rather  some  other  proposition  involving 
gensymmed  constants);  and  any  step  that  necessarily  asserts  p  but  is  only 
possibly  before  s  has  been  put  after s.  So  no  situation  before or equal  to s 
asserts p,  and by the truth criterion for complete plans p  is not true in s in this 
completion. 
The  next  case  is  that  in  which  there  is  a  clobberer  C.  To  construct  the 
falsifying completion first constrain C before s, which is possible because C is a 
clobberer. Then constrain every step still possibly after s to be actually after s, 
every step still possibly before C to be actually before C. This can be done, by 
application of the temporal consistency lemma, twice.  Now constrain codesig- 
nation of q  (the proposition possibly codesignating with p  which C denies) and 
p, which can be done because C is a clobberer, and constrain noncodesignation 
with p  of every postcondition  of every step  between  C  and  s,  which  can  be 
done by the noncodesignation consistency lemma and the observation that any 
such  step,  if it  now  necessarily asserted p,  would  be  a  white  knight.  Finally 
arbitrarily complete the result; see Fig. A.2  By the truth criterion for complete 
plans,  in this completion p  is false in s  C is a step that denies p, it is before s, 
and no step in-between asserts p. 
The last case is that in which there is an establisher and no clobberer. In this 
case, I will show, p  is necessarily true in s.  Choose any completion; Fig. A.3 is 
illustrative.  Since there  is  an  establisher  t, p  is  true  in  t.  Consider  the  set  of 
steps  { C,}  that possibly denied p  in the incomplete plan.  Each of these either 
does or does not  actually deny p.  The latter sort we can ignore; they do not 
endanger p's truth in s. Since remaining C, are not clobberers, there is for each 
a  corresponding white  knight  W,  asserting p  (since the white  knight  asserts p 
whenever  C,  denies  it).  There  may  in  turn  be  a  step  after  the  white  knight 
[ 
I 
steps possibly  make these  steps possibly 
before C  not assert p  after  s 
FIG  A  2  Falsifying p  m  a  plan with a  clobberer 
p  q 
Cl  W1  C2  W2  e 
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denying p;  but  it  must  also  have  its  own  white  knight  Since  there  are  only 
finitely many steps in the plan,  eventually p  will be asserted by a white knight 
and  not  denied before s  Then by the  truth criterion for complete plans, p  ~s 
true in s  [] 
A.2.  The outcomes lemma 
Outcomes Lemma.  Each of the three possible outcomes of TWEAK's algorithm 
(success,  fadure,  and  looping)  is  posstble  for  some  chotce  of  domain  and 
problem. 
Proof. A  trivial example of success is a problem with a single goal which is true 
in  the  initial  situation  A  trivial  example  of failure is  provided by a  problem 
that has at least one goal that is not true in the initial situation and which is not 
possibly asserted  by any available  step template.  An  example of nontermma- 
tion is given by the problem whose initial state is -g  and -h  and whose goals 
are  g  and  h  in  a  domain  in  which  there  are  two  step  templates,  one  with 
precondition  -h  and postconditions g and -h  and the other with precondition 
-g  and postcondihons h  and -g.  TWEAK loops on this problem, building plans 
that  are  longer and  longer chains  of steps  that  alternately assert g  and h.  [] 
A.3.  The correctness/completeness  theorem 
Correctness/Completeness  Theorem.  If  TWEAK, given  a  problem,  terminates 
clatming  a  solution,  the plan  tt produces  does  m  fact  solve  the problem.  If 
TWEAK returns  stgnalhng fatlure or does not halt, no solution extsts 
Proof.  This  follows  directly  from  the  use  of the  necessary  truth  criterion  m 
computing  whether  a  plan  solves  the  problem  given  and  in  constructing  the 
goal  achievement  procedure.  TWEAK's  incomplete  plan  always  has  the  same 
initial situation as the problem given, and the top-level loop continues until all 
the  goals  are  achieved,  at  which  point  the  plan  must  solve  the  problem  If a 
solution exists it must be a plan that in some way achieves the problem's goals 
Since  TWEAK'S  search  is  breadth-first,  and  since  the  nondetermmistlc  plan 
modification  procedure  generates  only finitely many  ways  to  produce  a  new 
plan  from  an  old  one,  TWEAK  eventually  examines  every  way  to  satisfy  a 
problem's  goals.  The  plan  must  also  have  all  preconditions  achieved;  but 
TWEAK also  tries all  ways to achieve preconditions  Thus,  if a  solution exists, 
TWEAK will  find it  [] 
A.4.  First undecidability theorem 
First  Undecidability  Theorem.  Any  Turing  machme  with  its  input  can  be 
encoded as a planning problem  m  the  TWEAK  representatton  Therefore,  plan- PLANNING FOR CONJUNCTIVE GOALS  371 
nmg  is  undecidable,  and  no  upper  bound  can  be put on  the  amount  of time 
required to solve a problem. 
Proof. The encoding is direct and straightforward. An mfinite set of constants t, 
are used to represent the tape squares. The binary relation successor represents 
the connectivity of the tape.  The functional binary relation contents represents 
the  contents  of the  tape,  and  the  set  of constants  a,  represent  the  alphabet 
written  on  the tape.  A  predicate  head holds of exactly one tape square,  that 
under the head.  A  set of constants s, represent  the finitely many states of the 
controller, and the predicate state holds of the current state only. For each arc 
from state s, to state sj in the controller's state graph there is an operator type. 
The  operator  has  four preconditions:  (state s,),  (head t)  where  t  is  a  variable 
representing the unknown square under the head, (contents t a), where a is the 
symbol the arc specifies to read, and (successor t u) if the arc says to move right, 
or (successor u t) if the arc says to move left. The operator has four postcondi- 
tions: (state sj), -  (state 0, (head u), (contents t b), where b is the written symbol, 
and  --(contents t a). 
The initial situation of the problem has (state i), where i is the initial state of 
the Turing machine controller, and (head t), where t is the initial tape square. 
The input to the machine is specified via the contents relation. There must be 
countably many successor propositions to encode the topology of the tape (and 
also countably many contents propositions to make all but finitely many squares 
blank). The final situation of the problem is just (state f), where f represents the 
halt state for the Turing machine. 
It is easy to see that a  valid plan for this problem amounts to a  trace of the 
encoded  Turing  machine  computation.  Such  a  plan  exists  iff  the  Turing 
machine halts.  Thus it is undecidable whether or not there  exists a  plan.  [] 
A.5.  The intractibility  theorem 
Intractibility Theorem.  The problem  of determimng  whether a proposition  is 
necessarily  true  in  a  nonlinear plan  whose action  representatton  is sufficiently 
strong to represent conditional actions, dependency of effects on mput situations, 
or derived side-effects  is NP-hard. 
Proof.  This  proof is  based  on  an  idea of Stan  Rosenschein's.  It  is  by direct 
reduction  from  PSAT,  or  rather  from  the  equivalent problem  of determining 
whether a  Boolean formula is valid (true under every truth assignment). 
Augment TWEAK's  action representation  by adding a  new type of step,  the 
conditional step.  A  conditional step is always applicable,  but has two sets of 
postconditions, the if-true and the if-false postconditions. The if-true postcon- 
ditions hold in the output situation if all the preconditions were satisfied in the 
input situation; otherwise the if-false postconditions hold. 372  D  CHAPMAN 
Given  a  propositional  formula  p  on  atoms  p,,  I  construct  a  plan  m  th~s 
representation and a proposition such that the proposition is necessarily true in 
the final situation lff p  is valid. The p, are recycled as propositions m  the plan, 
and all are made false in the initial situation  A  set of steps S z make the p, true, 
so that  a  truth  assignment  on the Pz corresponds to a  subset  of {S,} 
A  set  of conditional  steps,  {Cj},  check that p  holds  m  every truth  assign- 
ment.  Let p  be expressed as the disjuncuon of conlunctwe clauses.  There is a 
Cj for each clause, C  I has as its preconditions the conjunct p, in the correspond- 
ing clause.  The if-true postconditions  assert a  proposition called sattsfied;  the 
if-false postconditions are  null. satisfied is false m  the initial SltUaUon. 
What remains is to guarantee that all the Cj evaluate their clauses relative to 
the same  truth assignment.  This is done by introducing a  new "flag" proposi- 
tion called checking,  initially false, which is  made true by a  single  step  K  and 
false by a  single step  U.  K  and  U  have no preconditions and the are ordered 
respectively before and  after all  the  Cj.  The S l are made  conditional, so that 
they  assert sattsfied  if checking  holds.  Figure  A.4  illustrates  the  plan  I  have 
constructed. 
When does sattsfied hold in the final situation?  It holds whenever there are 
any S, between K  and  U, by the mechanism of the last paragraph.  If there are 
no S, between K  and  U,  the  C~ evaluate their clauses  in the  truth assignment 
corresponding to the set of S, before K. (The remaining S, are after U and have 
no  effect  on  satisfied.)  Since  every  truth  assignment  is  generated  by  some 
K 
I 
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completion of the plan, satisfied is necessarily true in the final situation just in 
case p  is  in fact valid. 
This establishes  the  result  for conditional actions.  For the rest,  it is easy to 
see  that  these  conditionals  can  be  simulated  with  dependency  of effects  on 
input  situations  or derived side  effects.  [] 
A.6.  Second undecidability theorem 
Second  Undecidability  Theorem.  Planning  is  undecidable  even  with  a  finite 
initial situation if the action representation is extended to represent actions whose 
effects  are a function  of their input situatton. 
Proof. Papert and McNaughton [39] showed that any recursive function can be 
computed by a  two-counter machine, i.e.  a  machine consisting of two positive- 
integer-valued registers  and a  finite state  control which can test either register 
for equality to zero and can increment or decrement either register.  I  encode 
such a  machine, with inputs,  as a planning problem, the goal of which is to get 
the  machine  into the  halt  state.  I  use  three  unary predicates  to represent  the 
state  of  the  machine,  counter,,  counter  2,  and  state.  States  and  integers  are 
represented by constants,  counter 1 and counter  2 hold of exactly one integer and 
represent  the contents of the  two counters; state  holds of exactly one state of 
the  finite  state  controller and represents  the  state  the  controller is  in. 
The initial  situation of the problem has (state s) where s  is the start state and 
(counter1 cl)  and  (counter  2 c2)  where  c1  and  c 2 are  the  values  the  two-counter 
machine  is  started  with.  There  is  an  operator for each  arc in  the  finite  state 
controller  The  operator associated with  the  arc  (sl, s2)  has  as  a  precondition 
(states1)  and  as  postconditions  (states2)  and  -(states1).  The  operators  as- 
sociated  with  increment  and  decrement  arcs  also  have  increment  and  decre- 
ments  of counteL  and counter  2 as  appropriate.  The branches are  implemented 
in the finite state  machine with nodes that have two arcs coming out of them, 
one labeled c, >0  and one labeled c, = 0  (for l in  (1, 2}).  These correspond to 
operators  that  have  those  same  tests  as  preconditions  and  no  postconditions 
other than  setting state. 
Now  any  plan  that  solves  this  problem  is  a  trace  of the  computation that 
would be executed by the two-counter machine. The planner has to do at least 
as  much work as  the  simulated  machine did.  [] 
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